Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (CONDAVORASANASA1770645741)
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Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of Oracle's Ransomware and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts Oracle Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Oracle breach identified under incident ID CONDAVORASANASA1770645741.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Oracle's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/oracle, the number of followers: 11005980, the industry type: IT Services and IT Consulting and the number of employees: 197447 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 120 and after the incident was 100 with a difference of -20 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Oracle and their customers.
Conduent recently reported "Global Ransomware Attacks Surge 32% in 2025, With Manufacturing and U.S. Organizations Hit Hardest", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.
In 2025, global ransomware attacks reached 7,419 incidents, marking a 32% increase from 2024.
The disruption is felt across the environment, and exposing 59.2 million records (confirmed), 31.2 petabytes (Qilin), with nearly ['59.2 million (confirmed)', '15.9 million (Conduent)', '5.4 million (Episource)', '3.49 million (University of Phoenix)', '2.69 million (DaVita)', '2 million (Sanrio)', '1.9 million (Asahi Group)'] records at risk, plus an estimated financial loss of ['£206 million ($276 million) in lost revenue (Co-operative Group)', '$276 million (Co-operative Group)'].
Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.
Overall, the incident is a reminder of why proactive monitoring and strong governance matter.
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating oracle zero-day vulnerability exploited in Clop attack on University of Phoenix, External Remote Services (T1133) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating manufacturing sector surge suggests remote access exploitation, and Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware groups like Qilin and Akira often use phishing for initial access. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware strains (Qilin, Akira) typically require user execution and Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating common ransomware tactic for lateral movement and execution. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware groups maintain access via compromised credentials and Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating common persistence mechanism for ransomware. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating zero-day exploits (e.g., Oracle) often used for privilege escalation and Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating compromised admin accounts used for privilege escalation. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware encrypts data to evade detection and hinder analysis and Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware often disables security tools to evade detection. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified OS Credential Dumping (T1003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware groups dump credentials for lateral movement and Credentials from Password Stores (T1555) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating common tactic to access high-value targets. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery (T1087) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware groups map networks to identify high-value targets and File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating used to locate sensitive data for exfiltration. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating common lateral movement method in ransomware attacks and Lateral Tool Transfer (T1570) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware tools transferred across compromised systems. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating 59.2M records compromised, 31.2 petabytes exfiltrated by Qilin and Data from Network Shared Drive (T1039) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating corporate data targeted in manufacturing and legal sectors. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware groups use C2 channels for data exfiltration and Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating tools transferred to compromised systems for further exploitation. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating 31.2 petabytes exfiltrated by Qilin, 8.5TB by SafePay (Conduent) and Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating common exfiltration method for large data volumes. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with high confidence (100%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware attacks encrypt data for financial gain, Data Destruction (T1485) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating potential data destruction if ransom not paid, and Inhibit System Recovery (T1490) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware often deletes backups to prevent recovery. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- Oracle Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/oracle/incident/CONDAVORASANASA1770645741
- Oracle CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/oracle
- Oracle Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/condavorasanasa1770645741-conduent-davita-sanrio-oracle-asahi-group-ransomware-january-2026/
- Oracle CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/oracle/history
- Oracle CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://industrialcyber.co/reports/global-ransomware-attacks-rose-32-in-2025-as-manufacturers-emerged-as-top-target/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf