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Analyze » OpenClaw » NPMOPE1773123849

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (NPMOPE1773123849)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-20
Company Score Before Incident655 / 1000
Company Score After Incident635 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERNPMOPE1773123849
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTORMalicious npm Package (Supply Chain Attack)
DATA EXPOSEDSystem passwords, macOS Keychain databases,...
INCIDENT DATE07/03/2026
STATUSOngoing

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of OpenClaw's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts OpenClaw Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the OpenClaw breach identified under incident ID NPMOPE1773123849.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of OpenClaw's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/openclawai, the number of followers: 2607, the industry type: Technology, Information and Internet and the number of employees: 5 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 655 and after the incident was 635 with a difference of -20 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on OpenClaw and their customers.

On 08 March 2026, a cybersecurity incident called "GhostClaw Malware Targets Developers via Rogue npm Package" came to light.

A sophisticated malware campaign, dubbed GhostClaw, has been uncovered, targeting software developers through a malicious npm package disguised as a legitimate tool.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting macOS, Linux, Windows, and exposing System passwords, macOS Keychain databases, cloud credentials (AWS/GCP/Azure), cryptocurrency seed phrases, browser-saved passwords/credit cards, iMessage history.

In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Remove .npm_telemetry directory, check shell configurations for injected hooks, terminate monitor.js processes, uninstall the package, and began remediation that includes Full credential rotation (SSH keys, API tokens, crypto wallets), browser session revocation, complete system re-image recommended, and stakeholders are being briefed through Advisories issued to affected developers.

The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as Developers must verify npm packages before installation, avoid granting unnecessary permissions (e.g., Full Disk Access), and monitor for suspicious post-install scripts. Supply chain attacks via package managers are increasingly sophisticated, and recommending next steps like Verify npm package authenticity before installation, Avoid granting unnecessary system permissions and Monitor for suspicious post-install scripts or hidden directories, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Affected developers advised to remove the .npm_telemetry directory, check shell configurations, terminate monitor.js processes, and uninstall the package. Full credential rotation and system re-image recommended.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools (T1195.001) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating malicious npm package disguised as a legitimate tool (@openclaw-ai/openclawai) and User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating trick developers into installing it via social engineering. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript (T1059.007) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating obfuscated setup.js dropper initiates payload delivery and User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating postinstall hook reinstalls package globally via malicious binary. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (T1543.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating hidden framework disguised as npm telemetry service, Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription (T1546.003) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating malicious binary embedded in system’s PATH, and Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating injected hooks in shell configurations. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching (T1548.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating spoofed macOS Keychain prompt requesting admin password. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating obfuscated setup.js dropper, 11,700 lines of encrypted JavaScript, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating disguised as OpenClaw Installer, hidden as npm telemetry service, and Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories (T1564.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating .npm_telemetry directory, monitor.js processes. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Credentials from Password Stores (T1555) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating macOS Keychain databases, browser-saved passwords, system passwords, Steal Application Access Token (T1528) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating cloud credentials (AWS, GCP, Azure) harvested, Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating cryptocurrency seed phrases (BIP-39) stolen, and Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys (T1552.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating sSH keys harvested. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating browser sessions, iMessage history, system passwords collected and Automated Collection (T1119) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating long-term data harvesting via hidden framework. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating aES-256-GCM-encrypted payload fetched from trackpipe.dev and Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating second-stage payload delivered via C2 channel. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating extensive data exfiltration (credentials, crypto wallets, iMessage). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools (95%)
User Execution: Malicious File (90%)
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript (90%)
User Execution: Malicious File (90%)
Persistence
Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (70%)
Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription (60%)
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (70%)
Privilege Escalation
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching (80%)
Defense Evasion
Obfuscated Files or Information (90%)
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (95%)
Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories (80%)
Credential Access
Credentials from Password Stores (95%)
Steal Application Access Token (90%)
Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (80%)
Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys (90%)
Collection
Data from Local System (95%)
Automated Collection (90%)
Command and Control
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (80%)
Ingress Tool Transfer (80%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (95%)

Sources & References