Rankiteo Logo
Rankiteo
Leader in Cyber Underwriting
Loading...
NEWRankiteo Cyber Underwriting Desktop - Score, price, and bind from your desktop
WindowsmacOSLinux
Download
Analyze » Open Code Mission » OPEANTOPECON1788942323

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (OPEANTOPECON1788942323)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-20
Company Score Before Incident752 / 1000
Company Score After Incident732 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBEROPEANTOPECON1788942323
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTORLocal storage exploitation, Dynamic collection rules, Ethereum smart contracts for C2 resolution
DATA EXPOSEDDeveloper credentials, MCP configurations, Prompt...
INCIDENT DATE31/12/2025
STATUSpublished

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Open Code Mission's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Open Code Mission Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Open Code Mission breach identified under incident ID OPEANTOPECON1788942323.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Open Code Mission's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/open-code-mission, the number of followers: 497, the industry type: Data Security Software Products and the number of employees: 3 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 752 and after the incident was 732 with a difference of -20 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Open Code Mission and their customers.

A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "Cybercriminals Expand Infostealer Malware to Target AI Coding Assistants", has drawn attention.

Cybercriminals are increasingly adapting information-stealing malware to harvest sensitive data from AI-powered coding assistants, including Claude, Cursor, Codex, Cline, Continue, and OpenCode.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting AI-powered coding assistants (Claude, Cursor, Codex, Cline, Continue, OpenCode, Gemini, Kilo), and exposing Developer credentials, MCP configurations and Prompt histories.

In response, and began remediation that includes Inventorying AI-agent deployments, Securing credential storage and Rotating exposed tokens post-breach.

The case underscores how teams are taking away lessons such as Attackers are exploiting the predictable local storage of high-value credentials and configurations on compromised endpoints. Organizations must treat AI-agent files as part of their identity and access attack surface, and recommending next steps like Inventory AI-agent deployments, Secure credential storage for AI tools and Rotate exposed tokens following a breach.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Drive-by Compromise (T1189) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating infostealers operate with dynamic collection rules on compromised endpoints and User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating infostealer malware to harvest sensitive data from AI-powered coding assistants. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating infostealer malware detected among tens of thousands of users and Command and Scripting Interpreter (T1059) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating remus employs syscall handling and indirect control-flow obfuscation. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (T1547) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating infostealers adapt to new AI tools via dynamic collection rules. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control (T1548.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating remus employs Application-Bound Encryption bypass. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating remus uses string obfuscation, anti-VM checks, and control-flow obfuscation, Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion (T1497) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating anti-VM checks employed by Remus infostealer, and Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating infostealers exploit predictable local storage of credentials. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Credentials from Password Stores (T1555) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating harvest sensitive data including access tokens, refresh tokens, API keys, Steal Web Session Cookie (T1539) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating browser cookies, cryptocurrency wallets, and password stores targeted, and Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating mCP configurations expose API keys, endpoints, authorization headers. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating dynamic collection rules update target directories, filenames, extensions and System Information Discovery (T1082) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating infostealers adapt to new AI tools gaining popularity. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating local data from Claude, Codex, Gemini, Cline, OpenCode, Kilo collected, Data from Information Repositories (T1213) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating prompt histories reveal internal hostnames, repository structures, and Data Staged: Local Data Staging (T1074.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating aI-agent data funneled into theft pipelines for browser cookies, wallets. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: DNS (T1071.004) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating ethereum smart contracts for EtherHiding-based resolution and Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating dynamic collection rules allow operators to update malware behavior. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating data breach impacting tens of thousands of users; data exfiltration confirmed and Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating stolen data likely funneled into theft pipelines for further exploitation. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Defacement: Internal Defacement (T1491.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating account hijacking via stolen access tokens and Account Access Removal (T1531) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating refresh tokens may extend unauthorized access. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Drive-by Compromise (50%)
User Execution: Malicious File (70%)
Execution
User Execution: Malicious File (70%)
Command and Scripting Interpreter (60%)
Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (50%)
Privilege Escalation
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control (60%)
Defense Evasion
Obfuscated Files or Information (80%)
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion (70%)
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (50%)
Credential Access
Credentials from Password Stores (90%)
Steal Web Session Cookie (80%)
Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (90%)
Discovery
File and Directory Discovery (80%)
System Information Discovery (60%)
Collection
Data from Local System (90%)
Data from Information Repositories (80%)
Data Staged: Local Data Staging (70%)
Command and Control
Application Layer Protocol: DNS (60%)
Ingress Tool Transfer (50%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (90%)
Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (60%)
Impact
Defacement: Internal Defacement (50%)
Account Access Removal (60%)

Sources & References