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Analyze » NXLog » ONENXLHYPINOONDEMP1780957588

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (ONENXLHYPINOONDEMP1780957588)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-17
Company Score Before Incident750 / 1000
Company Score After Incident733 / 1000
Company LinkView NXLog Profile
INCIDENT NUMBERONENXLHYPINOONDEMP1780957588
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTOREmail Phishing, Malicious GitHub Repositories, Fake Job Offers, Code Review Requests
DATA EXPOSEDBrowser Credentials, Cryptocurrency Wallets, Browser...
INCIDENT DATE31/03/2026
STATUSOngoing

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of NXLog's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts NXLog Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the NXLog breach identified under incident ID ONENXLHYPINOONDEMP1780957588.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of NXLog's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/nxlog, the number of followers: 4891, the industry type: Computer and Network Security and the number of employees: 76 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 750 and after the incident was 733 with a difference of -17 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on NXLog and their customers.

Ondo Finance recently reported "North Korean-Linked Phishing Campaign Targets Developers in Credential and Crypto Theft Scheme (UNK_DeadDrop)", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

A phishing campaign tracked as UNK_DeadDrop, suspected to be linked to North Korea, targeted over 250 individuals across nearly 100 organizations primarily in the U.S.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Windows, macOS and Linux, and exposing Browser Credentials, Cryptocurrency Wallets and Browser Cookies.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as The campaign highlights North Korea’s evolving cybercrime tactics, shifting from high-touch social engineering to large-scale phishing for financial gain. The use of legitimate tools (Overlord, Foundry, GitHub) and cross-platform malware underscores the growing sophistication of state-aligned threat actors targeting developers, financial services, and tech firms.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.001) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including unsolicited emails spoofing legitimate companies, and direct victims to malicious GitHub repositories and Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating fake job offers and code review requests via email. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating pre-configured task executes when victims open repositories in VS Code or Cursor and Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript (T1059.007) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating attack runs as JavaScript within VS Code’s Electron process on Windows. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating go-based backdoor derived from Overlord C2 framework. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching (T1548.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating fake system password prompt to escalate privileges on macOS. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating malicious GitHub repositories disguised as coding assignments or cryptocurrency projects, Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating anti-forensic cleanup to remove traces on Linux and macOS, and Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating repurposed legitimate red-team tool (Overlord C2 framework). Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (T1555.003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating browser credential theft (Chrome, Firefox, Chromium-based browsers), Steal Application Access Token (T1528) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating cryptocurrency wallet exfiltration (MetaMask, Phantom, Exodus, Ledger Live), and Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers (T1555.005) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating targeting 35 wallet extensions and 18 standalone wallets on Windows. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating extract credentials, cookies, and encrypted browser data from local systems and Automated Collection (T1119) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating python-based stealers to extract browser profiles and wallet data. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrates credentials and wallet data to attacker-controlled servers. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating go-based backdoor derived from Overlord C2 framework. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Phishing: Spearphishing Link (90%)
Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment (70%)
Execution
User Execution: Malicious File (90%)
Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript (80%)
Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (60%)
Privilege Escalation
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching (70%)
Defense Evasion
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (90%)
Indicator Removal: File Deletion (80%)
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (60%)
Credential Access
Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (90%)
Steal Application Access Token (80%)
Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers (70%)
Collection
Data from Local System (90%)
Automated Collection (80%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (90%)
Command and Control
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (80%)