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Analyze » New Canadians Centre » NEW1772742770

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (NEW1772742770)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-41
Company Score Before Incident755 / 1000
Company Score After Incident714 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERNEW1772742770
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTORSpear-phishing, Backdoors, Malware Deployment, Credential Harvesting
DATA EXPOSEDTrue
INCIDENT DATE31/01/2026
STATUSOngoing

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of New Canadians Centre's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts New Canadians Centre Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the New Canadians Centre breach identified under incident ID NEW1772742770.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of New Canadians Centre's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/newcanadianscentre, the number of followers: 846, the industry type: Non-profit Organization Management and the number of employees: 86 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 755 and after the incident was 714 with a difference of -41 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on New Canadians Centre and their customers.

On 01 February 2026, U.S. Bank disclosed Espionage, Cyber Attack and Data Exfiltration issues under the banner "Iranian APT Group Seedworm Targets U.S. and Israeli Networks Amid Escalating Conflict".

Since February 2026, the Iranian advanced persistent threat (APT) group Seedworm (also known as MuddyWater, Temp Zagros, or Static Kitten) has been detected on the networks of multiple U.S.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Networks, Cloud Storage and OT Systems, and exposing True, with nearly 1.3TB (alleged) records at risk.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how Ongoing, and recommending next steps like Defenders should anticipate DDoS and defacements targeting government, energy, transportation, and financial sectors, Monitor for credential harvesting (password spraying, mailbox compromises) against defense, NGOs, and logistics contractors and Prepare for hack-and-leak operations to intimidate and disrupt.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating seedworm employs social engineering including spear-phishing, Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating vulnerable cameras (CVE-2023-6895, CVE-2017-7921) exploited, and External Remote Services (T1133) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating backdoors (Dindoor, Fakeset) deployed via cloud storage. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python (T1059.006) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating fakeset such as A Python-based backdoor deployed and Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript (T1059.007) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating dindoor such as A Deno-based backdoor (JavaScript runtime). Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (T1543.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating backdoors (Dindoor, Fakeset) likely establish persistence and Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating custom malware historically used for persistence. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating password spraying attacks on Israeli municipal governments and Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating exploitation of known vulnerabilities (CVE-2023-6895). Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing (T1553.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating backdoors signed with certificates for Amy Cherne and Donald Gay, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating backdoors signed with legitimate-looking certificates, and Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating custom malware (Dindoor, Fakeset) likely obfuscated. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Brute Force: Password Spraying (T1110.003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating password-spraying attacks on Israeli municipal governments and Adversary-in-the-Middle (T1557) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating spear-phishing and mailbox compromises for credential harvesting. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery: Domain Account (T1087.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating aPT groups typically conduct account discovery post-access and Network Service Discovery (T1046) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating backdoors used for network reconnaissance. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltration attempts using Rclone to Wasabi cloud storage and Data from Information Repositories (T1213) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating targeted defense, aerospace, and financial sectors for sensitive data. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating backdoors communicate via cloud storage (Backblaze, Wasabi) and Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating fakeset downloaded from Backblaze cloud storage servers. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating rclone used to exfiltrate data to Wasabi cloud storage bucket and Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating backdoors (Dindoor, Fakeset) facilitate data exfiltration. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating historical use of wipers (BibiWiper) by Iranian-aligned groups and Data Destruction (T1485) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating druidfly deployed wipers destroying master boot records (MBRs). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Spearphishing Attachment (80%)
Exploit Public-Facing Application (70%)
External Remote Services (60%)
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python (90%)
Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript (80%)
Persistence
Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (70%)
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (60%)
Privilege Escalation
Valid Accounts (70%)
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (50%)
Defense Evasion
Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing (90%)
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (80%)
Obfuscated Files or Information (70%)
Credential Access
Brute Force: Password Spraying (90%)
Adversary-in-the-Middle (60%)
Discovery
Account Discovery: Domain Account (70%)
Network Service Discovery (70%)
Collection
Data from Local System (80%)
Data from Information Repositories (70%)
Command and Control
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (80%)
Ingress Tool Transfer (70%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (90%)
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (80%)
Impact
Data Encrypted for Impact (60%)
Data Destruction (50%)

Sources & References