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Analyze » Netgate » NETEGN1780907044

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (NETEGN1780907044)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-18
Company Score Before Incident752 / 1000
Company Score After Incident734 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERNETEGN1780907044
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTORCompromised pfSense firewall, valid credentials, malware deployment
DATA EXPOSEDTrue
INCIDENT DATE30/11/2024
STATUSCompleted (Volexity investigation)

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Netgate's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Netgate Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Netgate breach identified under incident ID NETEGN1780907044.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Netgate's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/netgate, the number of followers: 8098, the industry type: Computer Networking Products and the number of employees: 121 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 752 and after the incident was 734 with a difference of -18 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Netgate and their customers.

A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "VerdantBamboo Exploits pfSense Firewall in Long-Running Cyberattack", has drawn attention.

VerdantBamboo (also tracked as WARP PANDA and UNC5221) compromised a pfSense firewall and deployed a FreeBSD variant of the BRICKSTORM backdoor, granting persistent access to a managed service provider’s (MSP) network.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting pfSense firewall, Linux-based Egnyte Storage Sync virtual appliance and Synology NAS device, and exposing True.

In response, teams activated the incident response plan.

The case underscores how Completed (Volexity investigation), teams are taking away lessons such as Advanced threat actors target edge devices (firewalls, storage appliances, VPNs, NAS devices) with limited EDR coverage. Persistent access can be maintained for extended periods using valid credentials and malware like BRICKSTORM, and recommending next steps like Enhance monitoring of edge devices, implement robust EDR solutions, enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA), and conduct regular credential audits to prevent unauthorized access.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including compromised a pfSense firewall, and targeting edge devices with limited security monitoring and Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including leveraged valid credentials, and stolen administrative credentials. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating deployed a FreeBSD variant of the BRICKSTORM backdoor and Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell (T1059.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating modifying /etc/rc.d/cron to execute the implant automatically. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service (T1543.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating modifying /etc/rc.d/cron to execute the implant automatically and Server Software Component: Web Shell (T1505.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating bRICKSTORM supports file system access via a web interface. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including stolen administrative credentials, and enabled web SSL VPN access on the firewall. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating blending into normal traffic and bypassing Conditional Access rules, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating bRICKSTORM implant named *blocklist* in /usr/local/libexec/ipsec/, and Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating edge devices with limited security monitoring. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including stolen administrative credentials, and valid credentials. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery: Domain Account (T1087.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating access the victim’s Microsoft 365 environment and Network Service Discovery (T1046) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating lateral movement and traffic obfuscation. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating enabled web SSL VPN access on the firewall, Proxy: External Proxy (T1090.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including sOCKS5 proxying, and malware proxy features, and Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating stolen administrative credentials. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including data exfiltration, and access to a managed service provider’s network. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Proxy: External Proxy (T1090.002) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including sOCKS5 proxying, and communicating with attacker-controlled infrastructure, Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating deployed additional malware on a Synology NAS device, and Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating bRICKSTORM supports file system access via a web interface. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including data exfiltration, and communicating with attacker-controlled infrastructure and Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating access to Microsoft 365 environment. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Resource Hijacking (T1496) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating persistent unauthorized access, lateral movement. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Exploit Public-Facing Application (90%)
Valid Accounts (95%)
Execution
User Execution: Malicious File (80%)
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell (70%)
Persistence
Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service (80%)
Server Software Component: Web Shell (70%)
Privilege Escalation
Valid Accounts (90%)
Defense Evasion
Valid Accounts (90%)
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (80%)
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (60%)
Credential Access
Valid Accounts (95%)
Discovery
Account Discovery: Domain Account (70%)
Network Service Discovery (70%)
Lateral Movement
Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (70%)
Proxy: External Proxy (80%)
Valid Accounts (90%)
Collection
Data from Local System (80%)
Command and Control
Proxy: External Proxy (90%)
Ingress Tool Transfer (80%)
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (70%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (90%)
Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (60%)
Impact
Resource Hijacking (70%)

Sources & References