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Analyze » n8n » N8NNPM1768244856

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (N8NNPM1768244856)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-20
Company Score Before Incident756 / 1000
Company Score After Incident736 / 1000
Company LinkView n8n Profile
INCIDENT NUMBERN8NNPM1768244856
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTORMalicious npm Packages
DATA EXPOSEDOAuth tokens, API keys, sensitive...
INCIDENT DATE04/01/2026
STATUSOngoing (updated malicious package detected recently)

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of n8n's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts n8n Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the n8n breach identified under incident ID N8NNPM1768244856.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of n8n's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/n8n, the number of followers: 256751, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 663 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 756 and after the incident was 736 with a difference of -20 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on n8n and their customers.

n8n recently reported "Malicious npm Packages Targeting n8n Workflow Automation Platform to Steal OAuth Credentials", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

Threat actors uploaded eight malicious npm packages masquerading as integrations for the n8n workflow automation platform to steal developers' OAuth credentials.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting n8n workflow automation platform, developer environments using malicious npm packages, and exposing OAuth tokens, API keys, sensitive credentials for integrated services.

In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Malicious npm packages removed from registry, and began remediation that includes Disabling community nodes in self-hosted n8n instances (N8N_COMMUNITY_PACKAGES_ENABLED=false), and stakeholders are being briefed through Security advisories from n8n and Endor Labs.

The case underscores how Ongoing (updated malicious package detected recently), teams are taking away lessons such as Supply chain threats can target workflow automation platforms as centralized credential vaults. Community integrations expand the attack surface and lack sandboxing, enabling deep access to sensitive data. Developers must audit packages before installation and prefer official integrations, and recommending next steps like Audit npm packages before installation, Scrutinize package metadata for anomalies and Use official n8n integrations, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering n8n warned about security risks of community nodes from npm.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools (T1195.001) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including malicious npm packages designed to impersonate integrations for n8n, and eight malicious npm packages uploaded to target n8n and User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating tricking users into linking their accounts via a seemingly legitimate form. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter (T1059) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating malicious packages decrypted stored OAuth tokens using n8n’s master key and User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating malicious npm packages executed during workflow automation. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Steal Application Access Token (T1528) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including steal developers OAuth credentials, and exfiltrating credentials to attacker-controlled servers and Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating decrypted stored OAuth tokens using n8n’s master key. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating access environment variables, file systems, and decrypted credentials. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating transmitted them to external servers during workflow execution. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating malicious npm packages designed to impersonate integrations for n8n and Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing (T1553.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating trust in community-driven integrations exploited. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating oAuth tokens for Google Ads, Stripe, and Salesforce stolen. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools (95%)
User Execution: Malicious File (80%)
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter (70%)
User Execution: Malicious File (80%)
Credential Access
Steal Application Access Token (95%)
Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (90%)
Collection
Data from Local System (90%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (95%)
Defense Evasion
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (90%)
Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing (70%)
Lateral Movement
Valid Accounts (80%)

Sources & References