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Analyze » n8n » FLODEEANTOPEN8N1777984637

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (FLODEEANTOPEN8N1777984637)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-3
Company Score Before Incident762 / 1000
Company Score After Incident759 / 1000
Company LinkView n8n Profile
INCIDENT NUMBERFLODEEANTOPEN8N1777984637
Type of Cyber IncidentVulnerability
ATTACK VECTORExposed APIs, Unauthenticated Access, Hardcoded Credentials, Poor Deployment Practices
DATA EXPOSEDLLM conversation logs, API keys,...
INCIDENT DATE30/04/2025
STATUSCompleted

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of n8n's Vulnerability and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts n8n Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the n8n breach identified under incident ID FLODEEANTOPEN8N1777984637.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of n8n's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/n8n, the number of followers: 256751, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 663 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 762 and after the incident was 759 with a difference of -3 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on n8n and their customers.

A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "AI Infrastructure Security Crisis: Exposed Systems, Hardcoded Flaws, and Rampant Misconfigurations", has drawn attention.

A recent investigation by the Intruder team reveals an alarming trend in AI infrastructure security, as rapid adoption outpaces safeguards.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Self-hosted AI projects, Agent management platforms (n8n, Flowise) and Ollama APIs, and exposing LLM conversation logs, API keys and Business logic.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how Completed, teams are taking away lessons such as The investigation highlights the security debt accumulating in the AI gold rush, where rapid deployment is prioritized over security best practices. Key lessons include the need for default authentication, secure deployment practices, and avoiding hardcoded credentials, and recommending next steps like Enable authentication by default in AI projects, Secure Docker setups and avoid running applications as root and Remove hardcoded credentials from setup examples.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating scanning over 2 million hosts with 1 million exposed services, External Remote Services (T1133) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating 5,200+ exposed Ollama APIs with 31% responding to unauthenticated queries, and Valid Accounts: Default Accounts (T1078.001) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating no authentication by default in self-hosted AI projects. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Client Execution (T1203) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating arbitrary code execution found in a popular AI project and Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell (T1059.004) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating server-side code execution via exposed parsing tools. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Account Manipulation (T1098) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating users granted high-privilege access by default and Server Software Component: Web Shell (T1505.003) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating exposed agent platforms enabling workflow modification. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating applications running as root in misconfigured Docker setups and Valid Accounts: Local Accounts (T1078.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating hardcoded credentials in docker-compose files. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating no authentication enabled by default in AI deployments and Valid Accounts: Default Accounts (T1078.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating fresh installs with high-privilege access by default. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating hardcoded credentials in setup examples and docker-compose files and Unsecured Credentials: Container API (T1552.007) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating aPI keys leaked in plaintext by NSFW chatbots. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating exposed Flowise deployment revealed entire LLM chatbot’s business logic and Network Service Discovery (T1046) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating scanning over 2 million hosts with 1 million exposed services. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating lLM conversation logs and user conversation histories exposed and Data from Information Repositories: Code Repositories (T1213.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating credential lists and business logic exposed in Flowise deployments. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating data exposure via unauthenticated APIs and misconfigured services and Transfer Data to Cloud Account (T1537) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating cloud management integrations exposed via Ollama APIs. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Resource Hijacking (T1496) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating unauthorized access to enterprise systems via exposed APIs and Data Manipulation: Transmitted Data Manipulation (T1565.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating response poisoning and traffic redirection via exposed agent platforms. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Exploit Public-Facing Application (90%)
External Remote Services (80%)
Valid Accounts: Default Accounts (85%)
Execution
Exploitation for Client Execution (70%)
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell (60%)
Persistence
Account Manipulation (70%)
Server Software Component: Web Shell (60%)
Privilege Escalation
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (70%)
Valid Accounts: Local Accounts (80%)
Defense Evasion
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (70%)
Valid Accounts: Default Accounts (80%)
Credential Access
Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (90%)
Unsecured Credentials: Container API (80%)
Discovery
File and Directory Discovery (70%)
Network Service Discovery (90%)
Collection
Data from Local System (80%)
Data from Information Repositories: Code Repositories (70%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (70%)
Transfer Data to Cloud Account (60%)
Impact
Resource Hijacking (70%)
Data Manipulation: Transmitted Data Manipulation (80%)