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Analyze » Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine » BRAASSMIN1781511853

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (BRAASSMIN1781511853)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-3
Company Score Before Incident812 / 1000
Company Score After Incident809 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERBRAASSMIN1781511853
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTORSpear-phishing emails, Malicious RAR archives
DATA EXPOSEDPasswords, session cookies, master decryption...
INCIDENT DATE31/03/2026
STATUSOngoing

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine breach identified under incident ID BRAASSMIN1781511853.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/ministry-of-internal-affairs-of-ukraine, the number of followers: 0, the industry type: Public Policy Offices and the number of employees: 100 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 812 and after the incident was 809 with a difference of -3 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and their customers.

Ukrainian military innovation centers recently reported "Russian Hackers Exploit WinRAR Flaw to Steal Data from Ukrainian Organizations", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

Russian cyber threat groups are actively exploiting a patched WinRAR vulnerability (CVE-2025-8088) to infiltrate Ukrainian organizations, stealing passwords, session cookies, and sensitive files.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Windows systems with outdated WinRAR versions, and exposing Passwords, session cookies, master decryption keys, files with 35 extensions (e.g., spreadsheets, email files, KeePass databases).

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as WinRAR lacks automatic updates or enterprise patch management, leaving organizations vulnerable if manual updates are overlooked. The evolution of GIFTEDCROOK highlights increased sophistication in malware communication and evasion techniques, and recommending next steps like Ensure WinRAR is updated to the latest version, Monitor for indicators of compromise (IoCs) such as LNK/HTA files in Startup folder and connections to known C&C servers and Implement enhanced monitoring for obfuscated PowerShell scripts and unusual HTTPS traffic.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including spear-phishing emails containing malicious RAR archives, and malicious RAR archives and Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating exploiting a patched WinRAR vulnerability (CVE-2025-8088). Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating when opened with an outdated WinRAR version, the exploit silently drops hidden payloads, Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating powerShell loaders are heavily obfuscated to evade detection, and Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating drops hidden payloads into the Windows Startup folder. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating payloads into the Windows Startup folder...executes automatically upon next login. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating winRAR vulnerability (CVE-2025-8088) exploited for initial access. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating powerShell loaders are heavily obfuscated to evade detection, Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating malware removes staging files and Startup entries after exfiltration, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information (T1140) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating final payload never writes decoded files to disk, and Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window (T1564.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating exploit silently drops hidden payloads. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Steal Web Session Cookie (T1539) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating stealing passwords, session cookies, and master decryption keys, Credentials from Password Stores (T1555) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating extracts data from Chrome, Edge, Opera, and Firefox including passwords, and Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating scanning for files with 35 extensions (e.g., KeePass databases). Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating scanning for files with 35 extensions (e.g., spreadsheets, email files) and Email Collection: Remote Email Collection (T1114.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating files with extensions like .eml. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrated over HTTPS to command-and-control (C&C) servers, Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography (T1573.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating encrypted HTTPS communication, and Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating hTML Application (HTA) files hosted on Cloudflare Workers. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating stolen data is encrypted with dual-layer RC4 and exfiltrated over HTTPS and Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating hTA files hosted on Cloudflare Workers. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment (95%)
Exploit Public-Facing Application (90%)
Execution
User Execution: Malicious File (90%)
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (85%)
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (90%)
Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (90%)
Privilege Escalation
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (70%)
Defense Evasion
Obfuscated Files or Information (90%)
Indicator Removal: File Deletion (85%)
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information (80%)
Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window (70%)
Credential Access
Steal Web Session Cookie (95%)
Credentials from Password Stores (95%)
Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (80%)
Collection
Data from Local System (95%)
Email Collection: Remote Email Collection (80%)
Command and Control
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (90%)
Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography (80%)
Ingress Tool Transfer (70%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (95%)
Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (70%)

Sources & References