Comparison Overview
Midea RAC North America

Midea RAC North America
Foshan, Guangdong 528300, CN, Foshan, Guangdong 528300, CN
Last Update: 03/11/2025
Midea Residential Air Conditioning, subordinated to Midea Group, was started its industrial journey in 1985 when Midea achieved a global industrial layout for its residential air conditioners since the debut of its first air conditioner. Enjoyed the first ranking in Chi...

Panasonic
Ooaza Kadoma, 1006, Kadoma-shi, 571-8501, JP
Last Update: 23/09/2026
Founded in 1918, and today a global leader in developing innovative technologies and solutions for wide-ranging applications in the consumer electronics, housing, devices, B2B solutions and energy sectors worldwide, the Panasonic Group switched to an operating company s...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Midea RAC North America







Panasonic






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Appliances, Electrical, and Electronics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Midea RAC North America in 2026.
Incidents vs Appliances, Electrical, and Electronics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Panasonic in 2026.
Incident History - Midea RAC North America (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Midea RAC North America cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Panasonic (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Panasonic cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Midea RAC North America

Panasonic
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.