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Analyze » Microsoft Threat Intelligence » MIC1789115702

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (MIC1789115702)

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Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-178
Company Score Before Incident385 / 1000
Company Score After Incident207 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERMIC1789115702
Type of Cyber IncidentRansomware
ATTACK VECTORMulti-stage ClickFix infection chain, abuse of finger.exe utility, malicious batch script execution, IronPython exploitation, DLL reflective loading
DATA EXPOSEDNA
INCIDENT DATE31/05/2026
STATUSpublished

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Microsoft Threat Intelligence's Ransomware and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Microsoft Threat Intelligence Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Microsoft Threat Intelligence breach identified under incident ID MIC1789115702.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Microsoft Threat Intelligence's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/microsoft-threat-intelligence, the number of followers: 128397, the industry type: Computer and Network Security and the number of employees: None employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 385 and after the incident was 207 with a difference of -178 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Microsoft Threat Intelligence and their customers.

A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "New Windows RAT 'SloppyRAT' Emerges as Ransomware Enabler", has drawn attention.

A recently identified Windows remote-access trojan (RAT), dubbed SloppyRAT, has been observed in the wild as a tool for ransomware operations.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Windows systems.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how and recommending next steps like Monitor for outbound TCP/79 traffic (finger.exe abuse), Detect unexpected IronPython or pythonw.exe executions from user-writable directories and Block or monitor domains linked4x[.]com, skipraid[.]com, and Azure Blob Storage paths.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious Link (T1204.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating clickFix lures prompting users to paste commands into Run, PowerShell, or Terminal and Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies (T1195.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating downloads IronPython from GitHub to execute compressed, Base64-encoded Python payload. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell (T1059.003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating finger.exe abuse to fetch a batch script from attacker-controlled server, Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating arbitrary PowerShell execution via in-process .NET CLR invocation (PSInline), Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python (T1059.006) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ironPython exploitation to execute compressed, Base64-encoded Python payload, and User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating clickFix infection chain prompting users to paste commands. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating attempts to modify the Run registry key for persistence (flawed logic). Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating per-string XOR encryption, API hashing, indirect syscalls (Hell’s Gate-style), Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating copies curl.exe to AppData under numeric .com filename, Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs (T1070.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating reduces reliance on PowerShell logs via C++-implemented commands, Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing (T1553.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating tLS certificate pinning to block man-in-the-middle inspection, and Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information (T1140) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating base64-encoded Python payload, compressed IronPython execution. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery: Local Account (T1087.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating host enumeration (processes, services, users, network connectivity), System Information Discovery (T1082) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating wMI queries, file/registry manipulation, Defender preference alteration, and Network Service Discovery (T1046) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating reverse SOCKS proxy for internal network reconnaissance. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating reverse SOCKS proxy enabling lateral movement through infected endpoints and Windows Management Instrumentation (T1047) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating executes commands via Win32 Process such as :Create (WMI) to blend into admin activity. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating fetches config.py from Azure Blob Storage, C2 via skipraid.com, Proxy: Internal Proxy (T1090.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating reverse SOCKS proxy for routing traffic through infected endpoints, Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating downloads CastleLoader, CastleRAT from skipraid.com using K8VGmQTrzX User-Agent, and Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography (T1573.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating tLS certificate pinning to block man-in-the-middle inspection. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating reverse SOCKS proxy enabling data exfiltration for lateral movement. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating rAT observed as a tool for ransomware operations. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
User Execution: Malicious Link (80%)
Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies (70%)
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell (90%)
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (80%)
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python (80%)
User Execution: Malicious File (70%)
Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (60%)
Defense Evasion
Obfuscated Files or Information (90%)
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (80%)
Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs (50%)
Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing (70%)
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information (80%)
Discovery
Account Discovery: Local Account (80%)
System Information Discovery (90%)
Network Service Discovery (70%)
Lateral Movement
Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (70%)
Windows Management Instrumentation (80%)
Command and Control
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (90%)
Proxy: Internal Proxy (80%)
Ingress Tool Transfer (90%)
Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography (70%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (70%)
Impact
Data Encrypted for Impact (80%)

Sources & References