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Analyze » Microsoft Security Response Center » MICAXI1775125502

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (MICAXI1775125502)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-20
Company Score Before Incident606 / 1000
Company Score After Incident586 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERMICAXI1775125502
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTORMalicious npm package dependency
DATA EXPOSEDNA
INCIDENT DATE30/03/2026
STATUSOngoing

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Microsoft Security Response Center's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Microsoft Security Response Center Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Microsoft Security Response Center breach identified under incident ID MICAXI1775125502.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Microsoft Security Response Center's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/microsoft-security-response-center, the number of followers: 54723, the industry type: Computer and Network Security and the number of employees: None employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 606 and after the incident was 586 with a difference of -20 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Microsoft Security Response Center and their customers.

On 31 March 2026, Axios disclosed Supply Chain Attack issues under the banner "North Korean Threat Actor Compromises Axios npm Packages in Supply Chain Attack".

Microsoft uncovered a supply chain compromise involving two malicious versions of the widely used JavaScript HTTP client, Axios (1.14.1 and 0.30.4).

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Developer workstations, CI/CD pipelines, production systems.

In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Blocking malicious components, downgrading to safe Axios versions (1.14.0 or 0.30.3), and began remediation that includes Removing malicious artifacts, reinstalling clean packages, rotating exposed secrets.

The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as The incident highlights the risks of supply chain attacks, where a single compromised dependency can serve as a cross-platform malware delivery vector. Hardening npm usage by disabling auto-upgrades, pinning exact versions, and restricting dependency bots is critical, and recommending next steps like Rotate exposed secrets and downgrade to safe Axios versions (1.14.0 or 0.30.3), Remove malicious artifacts and reinstall clean packages and Harden npm usage by disabling auto-upgrades, pinning exact versions, and restricting dependency bots.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain (T1195.002) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including compromised Axios npm packages (1.14.1 and 0.30.4), and malicious dependency [email protected] introduced. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating powerShell RAT (6202033.ps1) persisted via hidden Run registry key, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python (T1059.006) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating python-based RAT (ld.py) executed with nohup on Linux, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell (T1059.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating macOS binary (com.apple.act.mond) executed via zsh, and User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating setup.js executed via npm post-install hook during package installation. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating powerShell RAT persisted via hidden Run registry key, masquerading as wt.exe and Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (T1543.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating rAT masquerading as wt.exe (Windows Terminal) suggests service persistence. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating rAT masquerading as wt.exe (Windows Terminal), com.apple.act.mond (macOS), Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating setup.js self-cleaned by deleting its loader and replacing with sanitized manifest, Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing (T1027.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating malicious dependency [email protected] executed silently during install, and Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing (T1553.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating bypassed standard CI-backed publishing processes for npm packages. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified System Information Discovery (T1082) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating setup.js fingerprinted platform (Windows, macOS, Linux) via encoded POST requests. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating contacted C2 infrastructure (hxxp such as //sfrclak.com such as 8000/6202033) and Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating downloaded tailored payloads from C2 (macOS binary, PowerShell RAT, Python RAT). Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating fingerprinted platform via encoded POST requests to C2 (sfrclak.com). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain (95%)
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (90%)
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python (90%)
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell (90%)
User Execution: Malicious File (85%)
Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (90%)
Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (70%)
Defense Evasion
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (90%)
Indicator Removal: File Deletion (85%)
Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing (70%)
Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing (60%)
Discovery
System Information Discovery (90%)
Command and Control
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (95%)
Ingress Tool Transfer (90%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (80%)

Sources & References