Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (MES1789741844)
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Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of MeshAgent's Ransomware and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts MeshAgent Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the MeshAgent breach identified under incident ID MES1789741844.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of MeshAgent's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/meshagent, the number of followers: 192, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 2 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 750 and after the incident was 635 with a difference of -115 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on MeshAgent and their customers.
On 01 September 2026, a cybersecurity incident called "New SETTRA Ransomware Operation Exploits MeshAgent for Persistence and Evasion" came to light.
A recently identified ransomware group, SETTRA, is leveraging the legitimate MeshAgent remote monitoring and management (RMM) platform to maintain persistence in compromised Windows environments while employing advanced defense-evasion and recovery-inhibition techniques.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Windows environments, and exposing Files encrypted with extensions .locked or .locked_wip.
Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.
The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as Monitor for unexpected MeshAgent deployments, suspicious driver installations, and log-clearing commands as potential ransomware precursors, and recommending next steps like Organizations are advised to monitor for unexpected MeshAgent deployments, suspicious driver installations, and log-clearing commands as potential ransomware precursors.
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating gains initial access through compromised VPN credentials and previously stolen valid accounts. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating stolen valid accounts used for persistence, External Remote Services (T1133) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating meshAgent RMM tool repurposed for persistence via 45.13.122.7 and 193.5.65.114, and Windows Service: Create or Modify System Process (T1543.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating meshAgent renamed to mvtcs.exe for persistence. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating bYOVD attack using gdrv.sys vulnerable kernel driver. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs (T1070.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating cleared Windows Event Logs, including PowerShell, Sysmon, and RDP activity, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating disabled recovery options via reagentc /disable, ipconfig /flushdns, diskpart, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating meshAgent renamed to mvtcs.exe to blend with legitimate processes, Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating used legitimate RMM tools and valid accounts to evade detection, Exploitation for Defense Evasion (T1211) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating bYOVD attack using gdrv.sys to bypass security controls, and Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories (T1564.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware executed from C such as \Perflogs (uncommon directory). Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified OS Credential Dumping (T1003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating procDump and Mimikatz used for credential theft. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery (T1087) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating netExec used, likely for account discovery and File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware tailored to target organization’s domain (e.g., victimdomain_win64.exe). Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating compromised VPN credentials suggest RDP or remote service abuse and Lateral Tool Transfer (T1570) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating pAExec used for lateral movement. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with high confidence (100%), supported by evidence indicating files encrypted with extensions .locked or .locked_wip, RESTORE_FILES.txt ransom notes, Inhibit System Recovery (T1490) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating reagentc /disable, diskpart targeting recovery partitions, cipher /w such as D such as \, and Data Destruction (T1485) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating cipher /w such as D such as \ overwriting free disk space to hinder file restoration. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- MeshAgent Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/meshagent/incident/MES1789741844
- MeshAgent CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/meshagent
- MeshAgent Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/mes1789741844-meshagent-ransomware-july-2026/
- MeshAgent CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/meshagent/history
- MeshAgent CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://gbhackers.com/settra-ransomware/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf