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Analyze » Mesa County, CO » MES1780346065

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (MES1780346065)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-73
Company Score Before Incident763 / 1000
Company Score After Incident690 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERMES1780346065
Type of Cyber IncidentBreach
ATTACK VECTORInsider Threat, Physical Access
DATA EXPOSEDSensitive voting data
INCIDENT DATE14/05/2026
STATUSClosed (conviction secured)

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Mesa County, CO's Breach and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Mesa County, CO Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Mesa County, CO breach identified under incident ID MES1780346065.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Mesa County, CO's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/mesa-county-co, the number of followers: 2367, the industry type: Government Administration and the number of employees: 633 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 763 and after the incident was 690 with a difference of -73 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Mesa County, CO and their customers.

Mesa County Election Office recently reported "Mesa County Election Security Breach by Former Clerk Tina Peters", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

Former Mesa County Clerk Tina Peters was convicted of seven felonies for breaching election security, including identity theft and tampering with voting systems.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Voting systems, security cameras, and exposing Sensitive voting data.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how Closed (conviction secured), teams are taking away lessons such as Need for stricter access controls and monitoring of election systems, insider threat mitigation, and recommending next steps like Enhance physical and digital security of voting systems, implement stricter access controls, conduct regular audits, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Election officials have warned about the seriousness of the breach and its impact on election integrity.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.001) with lower confidence (20%), supported by evidence indicating no evidence of phishing, but insider threat is primary vector and Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating former Mesa County Clerk used legitimate access to voting systems. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating insider maintained access via authorized credentials. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating clerk had elevated privileges to disable security cameras. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating disabled security cameras to evade monitoring and Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating used legitimate access to avoid detection. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating sensitive voting data copied, implying access to stored credentials. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating copied sensitive voting data from election systems. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltration confirmed, but method unclear and Exfiltration Over Physical Medium (T1052) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating insider physically copied sensitive voting data. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Destruction (T1485) with lower confidence (30%), supported by evidence indicating no evidence of data destruction, but tampering occurred and Defacement: Internal Defacement (T1491.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating tampering with voting systems undermined election integrity. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Phishing: Spearphishing Link (20%)
Valid Accounts (90%)
Persistence
Valid Accounts (80%)
Privilege Escalation
Valid Accounts (70%)
Defense Evasion
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (90%)
Valid Accounts (80%)
Credential Access
Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (60%)
Collection
Data from Local System (90%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (50%)
Exfiltration Over Physical Medium (80%)
Impact
Data Destruction (30%)
Defacement: Internal Defacement (70%)

Sources & References