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Analyze » Mercor » MER1775112166

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (MER1775112166)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-65
Company Score Before Incident748 / 1000
Company Score After Incident683 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERMER1775112166
Type of Cyber IncidentBreach
ATTACK VECTORMalicious code injection in open-source library (LiteLLM)
DATA EXPOSEDTrue
INCIDENT DATE27/04/2025
STATUSOngoing

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Mercor's Breach and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Mercor Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Mercor breach identified under incident ID MER1775112166.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Mercor's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/mercor-ai, the number of followers: 672135, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 5609 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 748 and after the incident was 683 with a difference of -65 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Mercor and their customers.

On 28 April 2025, Mercor disclosed Supply Chain Attack issues under the banner "AI Recruiting Unicorn Mercor Hit by Supply Chain Attack via Compromised LiteLLM Library".

Mercor, a $10 billion AI recruiting startup, confirmed a major security breach stemming from malicious code injected into the open-source LiteLLM project, a widely used library that powers thousands of companies globally.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Slack communications, Ticketing system and AI training pipelines, and exposing True.

In response, and began remediation that includes Removal of malicious code from LiteLLM.

The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as Critical vulnerabilities in AI infrastructure, particularly risks of relying on open-source tools like LiteLLM. A single compromise can cascade across industries, exposing sensitive data in AI training pipelines.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain (T1195.002) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including malicious code injected into the open-source LiteLLM project, and supply chain attack via compromised LiteLLM library. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter (T1059) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating malicious code injected into the open-source LiteLLM project. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Server Software Component: Web Shell (T1505.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating exposure window allowed threat actors to compromise downstream systems. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating access to Slack communications, ticketing system records, and AI training data. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating contractor data including professional credentials and payment details exposed. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery (T1087) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating slack communications, ticketing system records, and AI-contractor interactions accessed and File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating proprietary AI training data and client information exposed. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating slack communications, ticketing system records, videos of AI-contractor interactions collected and Data from Information Repositories (T1213) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating aI training data and client information tied to OpenAI and Anthropic accessed. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including lapsus$ posted samples of stolen data on its leak site, and data exfiltration confirmed. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Defacement: Internal Defacement (T1491.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating extortion group Lapsus$ claimed responsibility and leaked data and Data Manipulation: Stored Data Manipulation (T1565.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating malicious code injection in LiteLLM may have altered data integrity. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating exposure window allowed threat actors to compromise downstream systems. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain (95%)
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter (80%)
Persistence
Server Software Component: Web Shell (70%)
Privilege Escalation
Valid Accounts (70%)
Credential Access
Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (80%)
Discovery
Account Discovery (70%)
File and Directory Discovery (70%)
Collection
Data from Local System (90%)
Data from Information Repositories (80%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (90%)
Impact
Defacement: Internal Defacement (60%)
Data Manipulation: Stored Data Manipulation (50%)
Command and Control
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (70%)