Comparison Overview
ManpowerGroup Australia

ManpowerGroup Australia
Level 9, 201 Kent Street, Sydney, NSW, AU, 2000
Last Update: 02/01/2026
ManpowerGroup® (NYSE: MAN), the leading global workforce solutions company, helps organizations transform in a fast-changing world of work by sourcing, assessing, developing and managing the talent that enables them to win. We develop innovative solutions for hundreds o...

Express Employment International
9701 Boardwalk Boulevard, Oklahoma City, OK, US, 73162
Last Update: 03/04/2026
Founded in 1983 and corporately headquartered in Oklahoma City, Express Employment International supports the Express Employment Professionals franchise and related brands. The Express franchise brand is an industry-leading, international staffing company with franchise...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

ManpowerGroup Australia







Express Employment International






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Staffing and Recruiting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ManpowerGroup Australia in 2026.
Incidents vs Staffing and Recruiting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Express Employment International in 2026.
Incident History - ManpowerGroup Australia (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ManpowerGroup Australia cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Express Employment International (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Express Employment International cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

ManpowerGroup Australia

Express Employment International
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.