Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (LEV1782397631)
The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.
Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of LevelBlue's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts LevelBlue Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the LevelBlue breach identified under incident ID LEV1782397631.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of LevelBlue's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/levelbluecyber, the number of followers: 115083, the industry type: Computer and Network Security and the number of employees: 814 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 758 and after the incident was 738 with a difference of -20 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on LevelBlue and their customers.
A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "LokiBot Resurfaces in Sophisticated Multi-Stage Credential Theft Campaign", has drawn attention.
LokiBot, one of the longest-active credential-stealing malware families, has reemerged in a new campaign combining legacy techniques with modern evasion tactics.
The disruption is felt across the environment, and exposing Credentials from over 100 applications (browsers, cryptocurrency wallets, email clients, FTP tools).
Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.
The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as LokiBot's adaptability and use of modern evasion tactics (obfuscation, process injection, memory-resident execution) highlight the need for advanced detection mechanisms and continuous monitoring, and recommending next steps like Implement advanced email filtering to block malicious attachments, Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to detect process injection and memory-resident malware and Monitor for unusual outbound traffic to known C2 domains/IPs.
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating phishing email containing a malicious JScript attachment. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript (T1059.007) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating jScript file runs via Windows Script Host and Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating decoding a Base64-encoded PowerShell script. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including obfuscated script, and .NET assembly obfuscated with ConfuserEx, Process Injection: Portable Executable Injection (T1055.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating injecting the final LokiBot payload into aspnet_compiler.exe, Reflective Code Loading (T1620) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating loading .NET assembly directly into memory to avoid disk-based detection, and Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Evasion (T1497.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating erase traces if interrupted. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating attempts to establish a foothold via registry run keys. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Process Injection: Portable Executable Injection (T1055.002) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating injecting payload into aspnet_compiler.exe (trusted process). Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified OS Credential Dumping (T1003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating harvests credentials from targeted applications (browsers, wallets, etc.) and Credentials from Password Stores (T1555) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating targets credentials from over 100 applications (browsers, cryptocurrency wallets). Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating harvests credentials from targeted applications. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrates data to C2 server via HTTP (e.g., 158.94.211.95/kelly/five/fre.php) and Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography (T1573.001) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating 3DES-encrypted communication with C2 server. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrates stolen data to C2 server via 3DES-encrypted communication and Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating c2 domains (e.g., kbfvzoboss.bid, alphastand.trade). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- LevelBlue Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/levelbluecyber/incident/LEV1782397631
- LevelBlue CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/levelbluecyber
- LevelBlue Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/lev1782397631-levelblue-cyber-attack-may-2026/
- LevelBlue CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/levelbluecyber/history
- LevelBlue CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://cybersecuritynews.com/lokibot-campaign-uses-jscript-attachment/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf