Kames Capital A.I CyberSecurity Scoring
26/10/2025
Access Monitoring Plan
Access Monitoring Plan
No incidents recorded for Kames Capital in 2026.
No incidents recorded for Kames Capital in 2026.
No incidents recorded for Kames Capital in 2026.
Sonae exists to create a lasting positive impact on businesses, people, communities and on the planet. Managing a diverse portfolio of businesses in retail, financial services, technology, investments, real estate and telecommunications, Sonae makes the most of its expertise and pushes itself to create the future we all want and need. Creating today a better tomorrow, for all.
Sabancı Holding is one of Turkey’s leading conglomerate, engaged in a wide variety of business activities through its subsidiaries and affiliates, mainly in the banking, financial services, energy, industrials, building materials and retail sectors. Our Group companies most of which are leaders in their respective sectors. As Sabancı Group, we position ourselves in new economy, with global partnerships, employment for 60 thousand, and reaching more than 40 million people on 5 continents. We invest in energy & climate, material and digital technologies, through an agile global footprint to design a sustainable future with a goal of achieving 'Net Zero' by 2050. We stride confidently towards the future through Sabancı of New Generation culture and our purpose driven, stakeholder oriented, agile and diverse organization. We are committed to ensuring equal rights and opportunities to foster a positive and an inclusive work environment and to contribute to the socio economic development of the community. With tens of thousands of talents, stakeholders and investments in multiple businesses worldwide, what connects us is our purpose: We unite Turkey and the World for a sustainable life with leading enterprises.
Essar, with an entrepreneurial track record spanning 50+ years, specialises in investing and developing assets to create value in core sectors such as Energy, Infrastructure, Metals & Mining, and Technology & Retail. With a presence in eight countries, Essar generates revenues of US$15 billion and provides employment for over 7,000 people. Over the past five years, Essar has strategically rebalanced its portfolio by monetising some world-class assets. Essar is now positioned to transition its existing assets to a greener regime and invest in businesses driving the transformation of sector landscapes from carbon-centric to a clean energy ecosystem, both nationally and globally. The Group is developing sustainable assets and industry ecosystems, with a particular focus on hydrogen, green mobility, and green steel. Essar Foundation, the CSR arm of Essar, has a rich 50-year heritage of service across India, focusing on areas such as health, education, livelihood, women empowerment, sports, environment, and infrastructure.
Ackermans & van Haaren is a diversified group active in 4 core sectors: Marine Engineering & Contracting (DEME, one of the largest dredging companies in the world - CFE, a construction group with headquarters in Belgium), Private Banking (Delen Private Bank, one of the largest independent private asset managers in Belgium, and asset manager JM Finn in the UK - Bank J.Van Breda & C°, niche bank for entrepreneurs and liberal professions in Belgium), Real Estate & Senior Care (Nextensa, a Euronext-listed land and real estate developer focused on Belgium and Luxembourg) and Energy & Resources (SIPEF, an agro-industrial group in tropical agriculture). In 2023, through its share in its participations, the AvH group represented a turnover of 6.5 billion euros and employed 21,887 people. The group concentrates on a limited number of strategic participations with significant potential for growth. The AvH share is part of the BEL20 index, the BEL-ESG index of Euronext Brussels and the European DJ Stoxx 600.
Founded in 1944, Odebrecht is a Brazilian group with diverse businesses and world-class standards of quality. Its Members, guided by the Group’s own philosophy, the Odebrecht Entrepreneurial Technology (TEO), provide services and manufacture products for clients on five continents. As part of their entrepreneurial responsibility while serving clients and local communities, they contribute to the development of economically prosperous, socially just, environmentally sustainable, politically inclusive and culturally rich societies and countries.
Latest updates, reports, and threat intel affecting the global network.
The Bluetooth Classic Hands-Free Profile HF role in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/hfp_hf.c does not release the AT command buffers that are still queued on hf->tx_pending when the RFCOMM DLC goes down. hfp_hf_disconnected() only cancelled the work items and cleared hf->acl, and no other code path ever dequeues those buffers, so each one is permanently lost from the fixed hf_pool (CONFIG_BT_MAX_CONN + 1 buffers, i.e. two in the default configuration). The same function also left BT_HFP_HF_FLAG_CONNECTED set, and hfp_hf_create() wiped the object with memset() as soon as hf->acl was NULL, without checking whether hf->work, hf->slc_work or hf->deferred_work was still pending or running. The remote Audio Gateway peer controls the trigger end to end and needs no application involvement: an unsolicited +BCS: 1 response makes bcs_handle() call bt_hfp_hf_select_codec() and queue an AT+BCS buffer, which cannot be transmitted while BT_HFP_HF_FLAG_RX_ONGOING is set, and an immediately following RFCOMM DISC strands that buffer. Repeating the connect / +BCS / disconnect cycle a couple of times empties hf_pool for good. With the pool exhausted, HFP command sending fails permanently, and because hfp_hf_send_cmd() allocates with K_FOREVER (bt_rfcomm_create_pdu() → bt_conn_create_pdu()) from the Bluetooth RX context — where that timeout is not downgraded to K_NO_WAIT — one further +BCS from the peer parks the Bluetooth RX thread inside net_buf_alloc() with no possible waker, halting all HCI event processing until the device is rebooted. Separately, reusing the HF slot while a work handler was still queued or running allowed memset() to wipe live k_work items out from under the system workqueue, corrupting shared kernel workqueue state. Exploitation requires an established HFP session (for SSP devices L2CAP enforces authentication before the RFCOMM channel is reachable) and a build with CONFIG_BT_HFP_HF enabled.
The user-mode syscall verifier z_vrfy_rtio_cqe_get_mempool_buffer() in subsys/rtio/rtio_syscalls.c validated its two output parameters, buff and buff_len, with K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_READ() rather than K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE(). Both are pure out-parameters: z_impl_rtio_cqe_get_mempool_buffer() stores the mempool buffer address and its length through them. The distinction is enforced by every architecture validator — arch_buffer_validate() on RISC-V PMP explicitly accepts the global __rom_region/__rodata_region for reads only, and the ARM MPU validators accept P_RO_U_RO and P_RW_U_RO regions for reads only — so a read-validated pointer is not necessarily writable by the calling thread. An unprivileged user-mode thread that has been granted access to an RTIO context (rtio_access_grant()) can invoke the rtio_cqe_get_mempool_buffer() syscall with buff/buff_len pointing at memory it may read but not write, and with a completion-queue entry whose flags field it fully controls (only RTIO_CQE_FLAG_MEMPOOL_BUFFER in flags[7:0] is required; flags[19:8] and flags[31:20] supply the block index and count). The kernel then performs a pointer-sized and a 4-byte store through those addresses while running in supervisor mode. Reaching the store requires CONFIG_USERSPACE together with CONFIG_RTIO_SYS_MEM_BLOCKS, the configuration behind RTIO_DEFINE_WITH_MEMPOOL; without the latter the implementation returns -ENOTSUP and writes nothing. Two outcomes follow. If the target lies in a memory-domain partition declared K_MEM_PARTITION_P_RW_U_RO (privileged read-write, user read-only), the kernel-mode store succeeds and deposits partly attacker-chosen values into memory the memory domain had marked read-only for that thread, bypassing the partition's write protection. If the target lies in globally readable but unwritable memory such as .text/.rodata in flash, the store faults in kernel mode; the fault is delivered to z_fatal_error() and the default k_sys_fatal_error_handler() halts or reboots the device, giving an unprivileged thread a reliable full denial of service. The read-permission check does bound the damage: the address must still be readable by the calling thread, so kernel-private memory cannot be targeted and no confidential data is disclosed. The fix replaces both checks with K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE(), so a thread lacking write permission is terminated by K_OOPS before the implementation runs; the cqe argument correctly remains read-validated.
IBM Storage TS4500 Library 1.1.1.6 through 1.12.0.3 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to gain unauthorized administrative privileges due to a race condition.
The html_to_markdown expansion module in MISP Modules contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in its is_safe_url() URL validation function. The BLOCKED_RANGES list used to reject unsafe destination addresses was incomplete, omitting several critical IP address ranges. Specifically, the following ranges were not blocked: 0.0.0.0/8 (unspecified, which routes to loopback on Linux), 100.64.0.0/10 (carrier-grade NAT per RFC 6598), ::/128 (IPv6 unspecified), fc00::/7 (IPv6 Unique Local Addresses), and fe80::/10 (IPv6 link-local). The existing list only covered IPv4 loopback (127.0.0.0/8), RFC 1918 private ranges, IPv4 link-local (169.254.0.0/16), and IPv6 loopback (::1/128). An authenticated user with the ability to create or modify MISP attributes that trigger the html_to_markdown expansion module could supply URLs pointing to these unblocked internal address ranges. Because the module fetches the URL server-side to convert HTML content to Markdown, the request is made from the MISP server's network context. This allows an attacker to probe and read responses from internal services, carrier-grade NAT infrastructure, or link-local endpoints that would otherwise be unreachable from external networks. IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms (e.g., [::ffff:0.0.0.0]) also bypassed the existing checks. The security impact is primarily confidentiality: an attacker can read data served by internal services reachable from the MISP server. The MISP instance itself is not compromised, but it is abused as a proxy to access otherwise restricted network resources.
A weakness has been identified in H3C Magic NX15 V100R017. This affects the function importprofile of the file /api/upload. This manipulation of the argument fileName causes path traversal. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure.
curl -i -X GET 'https://api.rankiteo.com/underwriter-getcompany-history?
linkedin_id=axa' -H 'apikey: YOUR_API_KEY_HERE'
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