Rankiteo Logo
Rankiteo
Leader in Cyber Underwriting
Loading...
NEWRankiteo Cyber Underwriting Desktop - Score, price, and bind from your desktop
WindowsmacOSLinux
Download
Analyze » Ivanti » PULSOPFORIVA1773404773

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (PULSOPFORIVA1773404773)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-20
Company Score Before Incident637 / 1000
Company Score After Incident617 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERPULSOPFORIVA1773404773
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTORSEO Poisoning, Trojanized Installers
DATA EXPOSEDVPN credentials and configuration data
INCIDENT DATE14/01/2026
STATUSOngoing

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Ivanti's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Ivanti Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Ivanti breach identified under incident ID PULSOPFORIVA1773404773.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Ivanti's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/ivanti, the number of followers: 165752, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 2975 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 637 and after the incident was 617 with a difference of -20 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Ivanti and their customers.

On 15 January 2026, Fortinet disclosed Credential Theft issues under the banner "Storm-2561 Exploits SEO Poisoning and Fake VPN Installers in Credential Theft Campaign".

Since May 2025, the financially motivated threat actor Storm-2561 has been conducting a credential theft campaign targeting enterprise VPN users by abusing SEO poisoning and trojanized VPN installers.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Enterprise VPN users, and exposing VPN credentials and configuration data.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as The campaign highlights the risks of SEO manipulation, brand impersonation, and code-signing abuse in credential theft operations, and recommending next steps like Block known malicious domains (e.g., vpn-fortinet[.]com, ivanti-vpn[.]org), Monitor for unusual VPN process execution and Revoke and investigate abused code-signing certificates.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating manipulated search engine results to direct victims to spoofed VPN download sites and Drive-by Compromise (T1189) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating sEO poisoning to distribute trojanized installers via malicious GitHub repository. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating trojanized MSI installer disguised as legitimate VPN client and Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell (T1059.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating dwmapi.dll acted as in-memory loader executing shellcode. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating persistence maintained via Windows RunOnce registry key. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing (T1553.002) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating abuse of legitimate code-signing certificate issued to Taiyuan Lihua Near Information Technology, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating malware components named Pulse.exe, dwmapi.dll under %CommonFiles%\Pulse Secure, and Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating dwmapi.dll acted as in-memory loader executing shellcode. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (T1555.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating targeted stored VPN credentials from connectionstore.dat and Input Capture: Keylogging (T1056.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating fake VPN client displayed realistic GUI prompting users for credentials. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating targeted VPN credentials and configuration data from C such as \ProgramData\Pulse Secure. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrated data to command-and-control server at 194.76.226.93 such as 8080. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Phishing: Spearphishing Link (90%)
Drive-by Compromise (80%)
Execution
User Execution: Malicious File (90%)
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell (70%)
Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (80%)
Defense Evasion
Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing (95%)
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (90%)
Obfuscated Files or Information (80%)
Credential Access
Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (70%)
Input Capture: Keylogging (60%)
Collection
Data from Local System (90%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (90%)

Sources & References