Comparison Overview
Iterable

Iterable
201 Spear St, San Francisco, 94105, US
Last Update: 09/03/2026
Iterable is the AI customer engagement platform built for enterprise scale, loved by teams, and trusted by global brands like Priceline, Fabletics, Blockchain, and Box. It transforms data into action, powering intelligent, personalized experiences across every channel t...

PayPal
2211 North First Street, San Jose, 95131, US
Last Update: 09/09/2026
We're championing possibilities for all by making money fast, easy, and more enjoyable. Our hope is to unlock opportunities for people in their everyday lives and empower the millions of people and businesses around the world who trust, rely, and use PayPal every day. ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Iterable







PayPal






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
Iterable has 5.66% fewer incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
PayPal has 579.61% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Iterable (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Iterable cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - PayPal (X = Date, Y = Severity)
PayPal cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Iterable

PayPal
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.