Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (IRO1778142529)
The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.
Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of Iron Software's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts Iron Software Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Iron Software breach identified under incident ID IRO1778142529.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Iron Software's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/ironsoftware, the number of followers: 5020, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 52 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 751 and after the incident was 732 with a difference of -19 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Iron Software and their customers.
On 01 September 2025, a cybersecurity incident called "Malicious NuGet Packages Target .NET Developers, Stealing Credentials and Crypto Data" came to light.
A sophisticated campaign is leveraging malicious NuGet packages to steal browser credentials, SSH keys, and cryptocurrency wallet data from developer machines and CI/CD infrastructure, with a focus on Chinese .NET ecosystems.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Developer workstations, CI/CD pipelines, and exposing Browser credentials, SSH keys, cryptocurrency wallet data, Outlook profiles, Steam sessions, documents from Desktop/Documents/Downloads directories.
In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Scan for the five package IDs, rotate exposed credentials, block traffic to C2 infrastructure, and began remediation that includes Remove malicious packages, clean infected systems, rotate credentials.
The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as Supply chain attacks via package managers (NuGet) can evade detection through obfuscation and version rotation. Cross-platform malware targeting developers poses significant risks to CI/CD pipelines and sensitive data, and recommending next steps like Scan for the five malicious package IDs (IR.DantUI, IR.OscarUI, IR.Infrastructure.Core, IR.Infrastructure.DataService.Core, IR.iplus32), Rotate all exposed credentials (browser, SSH, cryptocurrency wallets, etc.) and Block traffic to the C2 domain (dns-providersa2[.]com), with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Defenders should assume compromise if systems loaded these packages since September 2025. Rotate credentials and monitor for data exfiltration.
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain (T1195.002) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating malicious NuGet packages (IR.DantUI, IR.OscarUI, etc.) published under bmrxntfj. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating execution begins upon loading any IR.* assembly, triggering multi-stage infection and Compromise Client Software Binary (T1554) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating hooks clrjit.dll!getJit to inject attacker-controlled code during JIT compilation. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Event Triggered Execution: Image File Execution Options Injection (T1546.012) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating jIT compilation hooking (clrjit.dll!getJit) for persistence. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Process Injection: Portable Executable Injection (T1055.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating allocates read-write-execute memory, injects code via JIT compilation hooking. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating heavily obfuscated .NET Reactor-protected infostealer, 219 hidden versions, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating mimics legitimate Chinese WinForms and enterprise libraries, Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories (T1564.001) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating 219 deliberately hidden versions to evade detection, and Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information (T1140) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating verifies RSA-1024 anti-tamper signature before execution. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (T1555.003) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating targets 12 Chromium-based browsers, Firefox, Thunderbird for passwords/session cookies, Steal Application Access Token (T1528) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating extracts session cookies via IElevator COM interface exploitation, and Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating harvests SSH keys, Outlook profiles, Steam sessions, documents. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating targets Desktop, Documents, Downloads directories for documents, Input Capture: Keylogging (T1056.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating likely captures input from cryptocurrency wallet interactions, and Data from Information Repositories: Confluence (T1213.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating targets developer workstations and CI/CD pipelines (implied). Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrates to https such as //dns-providersa2.com/upload with randomized headers and Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating stages data at C such as \ProgramData\Microsoft OneDrive\keys.dat. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating c2 domain dns-providersa2.com resolves to VDSINA VPS in Amsterdam, Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating likely downloads additional payloads (implied by multi-stage infection), and Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms (T1568.002) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating c2 domain registered in March 2026 (potential DGA). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- Iron Software Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/ironsoftware/incident/IRO1778142529
- Iron Software CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/ironsoftware
- Iron Software Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/iro1778142529-nuget-cyber-attack-september-2025/
- Iron Software CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/ironsoftware/history
- Iron Software CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://gbhackers.com/malicious-nuget-packages-2/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf