Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (INTBLA1782304111)
The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.
Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of Interlock's Ransomware and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts Interlock Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Interlock breach identified under incident ID INTBLA1782304111.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Interlock's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/interlock-network, the number of followers: 936, the industry type: Computer and Network Security and the number of employees: 9 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 749 and after the incident was 635 with a difference of -114 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Interlock and their customers.
A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "New Mistic Backdoor Linked to KongTuke Initial Access Broker in Targeted Attacks", has drawn attention.
A newly identified backdoor, dubbed Mistic, has been deployed in financially motivated cyberattacks targeting organizations in the insurance, education, IT, and professional services sectors.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Corporate networks, and exposing True.
Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.
The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as The emergence of Mistic highlights the growing trend of custom backdoors developed by IABs with ties to ransomware groups, emphasizing the need for enhanced detection of stealthy, in-memory malware and modular attack tools, and recommending next steps like Monitor for IoCs related to Mistic/MTLBackdoor and KongTuke activity, Enhance detection for in-memory execution and side-loading techniques and Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) to mitigate credential harvesting.
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating social engineering over Microsoft Teams and User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating execution of a legitimate MpExtMs.exe binary to side-load malicious version.dll. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating execution of a legitimate MpExtMs.exe binary to side-load malicious version.dll and Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating in-memory code execution (avoiding disk writes). Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading (T1574.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating side-loading via legitimate MpExtMs.exe binary to load malicious version.dll and Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating designed for stealth and long-term persistence. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading (T1574.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating side-loading via legitimate MpExtMs.exe binary to load malicious version.dll. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating filename mimics Microsoft endpoint security tools (EndpointDlp.dll), Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection (T1055.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating side-loading via legitimate MpExtMs.exe binary, Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Evasion (T1497.003) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating adjustable C2 polling frequency, Reflective Code Loading (T1620) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating in-memory code execution (avoiding disk writes), and Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating self-termination and file deletion via a kill switch. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Input Capture: GUI Input Capture (T1056.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating fake login screen to harvest credentials via .NET DLL. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating file manipulation capabilities (upload/download, move, rename, delete). Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating establishes communication with its command-and-control (C2) server and Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating file manipulation (upload/download). Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating file manipulation (upload/download) to C2 server. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- Interlock Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/interlock-network/incident/INTBLA1782304111
- Interlock CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/interlock-network
- Interlock Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/intbla1782304111-interlock-black-basta-ransomware-may-2026/
- Interlock CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/interlock-network/history
- Interlock CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/stealthy-mistic-backdoor-linked-to-ransomware-access-broker-kongtuke/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf