Comparison Overview
ING Poland

ING Poland
Sokolska 34, Katowice, PL, 40-086
Last Update: 28/03/2026
The website belongs to ING Bank Śląski S.A. with its registered office in Katowice, postal code: 40-086, at ul. Sokolska 34. Information clause (pdf): https://www.ing.pl/klauzula. ING Bank Slaski from ING Group is one of the biggest banks in Poland. We provide integrat...

Westpac
Head Office: 200 Barangaroo Avenue, Sydney, 2000, AU
Last Update: 29/03/2026
To turn doing into done, it takes a little Westpac. From rescue helicopters and signing the Equator Principles, to paying super during parental leave and initiatives like Westpac SaferPay and SafeCall that help protect customers from scams... we have a proud history of...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

ING Poland







Westpac






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ING Poland in 2026.
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Westpac in 2026.
Incident History - ING Poland (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ING Poland cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Westpac (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Westpac cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

ING Poland

Westpac
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. Prior to 2.1.5, the httpserver/handler.go sendFile handler opened files using a cleaned path but derived the authorization filename from raw req.URL.Path, so a trailing slash could bypass .goshs ACL-file protection and block-list checks. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.5.
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. Prior to 2.1.5, the httpserver/updown.go multipart upload handler split part.FileName() on / but did not reject .., allowing an unauthenticated upload with filename .. to create a file outside the served tree. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.5.
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. Prior to 2.1.4, the httpserver/server.go wdGuard handled WebDAV MOVE as a write-only method and did not enforce --no-delete, allowing WebDAV clients to delete or overwrite files via MOVE with Overwrite: T. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.4.
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. From 2.1.3 until 2.1.4, the sftpserver/sftpserver.go password handler used Username != "" && Password != "", so running goshs with -b 'admin:' -sftp and no -fkf left both SFTP authentication handlers unset and allowed unauthenticated file access. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.4.
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, HttpPostRequestEncoder constructs multipart HTTP request bodies by directly concatenating user-supplied filenames and field names into Content-Disposition MIME headers without validating or sanitizing CRLF characters (\r\n). Since MIME headers are delimited by CRLF, an attacker who controls the filename can inject arbitrary MIME headers into the multipart body part. The root cause is that neither the encoder nor the FileUpload implementations' setFilename() methods, which only check for null, neutralize CRLF characters before the filename is embedded into the header. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.