Infosecurity Brasil A.I CyberSecurity Scoring
02/12/2025
Access Monitoring Plan
Access Monitoring Plan
No incidents recorded for Infosecurity Brasil in 2026.
No incidents recorded for Infosecurity Brasil in 2026.
No incidents recorded for Infosecurity Brasil in 2026.
## Our core business We manage linux / unix server infrastructures and build the efficient and secure networking environments using hardware cutting edge technologies suited to the needs of the project and the client. We believe in quality, opposed to quantity. Our company consists of highly qualified, experienced people, who share a common passion of both server and network infrastructure management. ## Our principles We stated basic principles, that we see as crucial in successful delivery of a stable and secure network environment project: • we tend to give client what he needs, not what he wants • we believe in open communication with client • client is not our enemy • "strict" is for corporations, we believe in "flexible" • teamwork - share victory, share defeat ## What we do best We specialise in linux / unix server and large network environments management. We think, that every need deserves a custom solution, as in most of cases it is cheaper and easier, than a ready solution with after-integration pain. We deliver individual solutions, that best fulfill need of our clients. The impact is put always on high quality and technological innovation of the project. ## Technologies we use We use a set of technologies we think are best suitable for big projects and those we have experience with, although we do not limit ourselves to them only. We constantly seek for new horizons, new trends and test them, so when they become mature, we can make use of them in our work. Network Security Solutions is always in search of new possibilities. ## Our offer Linux / Unix servers and network Router / Switch management, from big complicated environments to smaller ones. We offer hosting on our servers as well as the ability to manage servers from our customers. We provide 24/7/365 monitoring for customers whose services we manage.
CrowdStrike (Nasdaq: CRWD), a global cybersecurity leader, has redefined modern security with the world’s most advanced cloud-native platform for protecting critical areas of enterprise risk — endpoints and cloud workloads, identity and data. Powered by the CrowdStrike Security Cloud and world-class AI, the CrowdStrike Falcon® platform leverages real-time indicators of attack, threat intelligence, evolving adversary tradecraft and enriched telemetry from across the enterprise to deliver hyper-accurate detections, automated protection and remediation, elite threat hunting and prioritized observability of vulnerabilities. Purpose-built in the cloud with a single lightweight-agent architecture, the Falcon platform delivers rapid and scalable deployment, superior protection and performance, reduced complexity and immediate time-to-value. CrowdStrike: We stop breaches.
Palo Alto Networks, the global cybersecurity leader, is shaping the cloud-centric future with technology that is transforming the way people and organizations operate. Our mission is to be the cybersecurity partner of choice, protecting our digital way of life. We help address the world's greatest security challenges with continuous innovation that seizes the latest breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, analytics, automation, and orchestration. By delivering an integrated platform and empowering a growing ecosystem of partners, we are at the forefront of protecting tens of thousands of organizations across clouds, networks, and mobile devices. Our vision is a world where each day is safer and more secure than the one before. For more information, visit www.paloaltonetworks.com.
Latest updates, reports, and threat intel affecting the global network.
Trustwave SpiderLabs has observed new banking Trojan Eternidade Stealer targeting Brazil using WhatsApp for propagation and data theft.
The global cybersecurity market size is projected to grow from $218.98 billion in 2025 to $562.77 billion by 2032, at a CAGR of 14.4% during...
Cybersecurity is touted as having a zero unemployment rate. It is one of the fastest-growing and in-demand professions in the world today as...
Attackers used valid credentials for financial technology provider Sinqia to steal $130 million from two financial services firms in Brazil,...
HireRight is pleased to announce the appointment of Jim Desmond as Chief Information Security Officer, effective immediately.
The 2025 Cybersecurity Report, released by Brasscom – Association of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and Digital Technologies...
Equifax BoaVista announces Ramiro Rodrigues as its new Director of Cybersecurity for Brazil. Rodrigues holds a Master's degree in Management...
Brazil is modernizing its cybersecurity infrastructure, placing AI at the heart of its strategy. Andre Luiz Bandeira Molina, secretary of...
Survey with 208 managers and directors in Brazil underscores poor level of cybersecurity academic training.
A remote attacker who controls a container registry may be able to direct a client's token request to a host of the attacker's choice, and disclose the victim's registry credentials to that host. This vulnerability is addressed in containerization version 0.41.0.
djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, the djust live transport resolves the LiveView to mount from a client-supplied dotted path by calling `__import__(module_path, ...)`. The module is imported — running its top-level code (import side effects) — before the framework checks that the resolved object is a `LiveView` subclass and before any per-view authentication. The `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` allowlist that should contain this is fail-open (`if allowed_modules:` — skipped when the setting is unset, the framework default) and uses loose `startswith` matching. An unauthenticated WebSocket client (the WS handshake does not require auth; per-view auth runs only after import + instantiate) can therefore send a `mount` / `live_redirect_mount` / `url_change` frame (or an SSE mount) with `view = "<any.importable.module>.AnyName"` and cause the server to import — and execute the top-level code of — any importable Python module by name. Version 1.0.7 fixes the issue with a fail-closed resolution gate (`djust._view_resolution.is_view_import_allowed`): a client view path resolves only if (a) its module is already loaded (`sys.modules` — so resolving runs no new code; URL-routed views loaded by URLconf at startup keep working with zero config) or (b) it matches `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` on a module-segment boundary (explicit opt-in for lazily-imported views). The gate runs before `__import__` at all three sinks (+ defense-in-depth inside `_instantiate_view`). As a workaround, set `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` to the narrow list of modules that contain your mountable LiveView classes. (Note: pre-patch the allowlist is `startswith`-matched and the import still precedes the subclass check, so this is mitigation, not a complete fix.)
djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, djust's per-object authorization (`get_object` + `has_object_permission`, ADR-017) was enforced on the WebSocket mount and event paths but not on three other render entry points: (a) the initial HTTP GET render, (b) SPA `url_change` navigation, and (c) `{% live_render %}` embedded child views. An authenticated user could therefore view (and on some paths act on) an object they are not authorized for by loading the page directly, navigating to it via SPA url-change, or composing it as an embedded child — a classic IDOR / broken object-level access control on object-scoped views. This is fixed in djust 1.0.7. All render entry points now route through a shared `enforce_object_permission` chokepoint: HTTP GET returns 403, `url_change` emits a `permission_denied` frame and skips the render, and `{% live_render %}` (eager + lazy) refuses the embed. Views without a custom `get_object` are unaffected (no-op). No reliable workaround short of upgrading. Do not expose object-scoped views through the HTTP-GET / url_change / live_render paths until patched.
djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, the WebSocket `handle_mount` and `ViewRuntime._build_request` rebuild an `HttpRequest` via `RequestFactory().get(...)` with no `HTTP_HOST`, so `request.get_host()` defaulted to `"testserver"` on the live path. Host/subdomain/domain `TenantResolver`s then misresolved the tenant — `None` on the live path while the HTTP path resolved correctly. With `STRICT_MODE=False` the tenant-scoped managers returned unscoped rows (cross-tenant disclosure); with the default they returned an empty queryset (broken tenancy). This is fixed in djust 1.0.7. The handshake Host is extracted from the ASGI scope, validated against `ALLOWED_HOSTS` (the same logic as the CSWSH Origin gate, parsed with Django's `split_domain_port` so malformed Hosts are rejected at the boundary), and propagated — with the TLS scheme — into the reconstructed request, so live-path tenant resolution matches HTTP exactly. There is no known workaround on the live path short of upgrading. Users are most exposed when combined with `STRICT_MODE=False`.
djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, when a Django `Model` instance is assigned to a public view attribute, djust serialized it to the client with no sensitive-field denylist — sending fields such as `password` (the hash), privilege flags (e.g. `is_staff` / `is_superuser`), tokens, and other PII to the browser. Because exposing model objects to templates is a normal djust pattern, this could leak credentials/PII without the developer realizing the full object crossed the wire. This is fixed in djust 1.0.7. Model serialization applies a secure-by-default sensitive-field denylist (password/hash/token/secret-style fields and known privilege flags are withheld) with an identity-subset fallback. As a workaround, keep `Model` instances on `_private` attributes and expose only the specific fields needed, until patched.
curl -i -X GET 'https://api.rankiteo.com/underwriter-getcompany-history?
linkedin_id=axa' -H 'apikey: YOUR_API_KEY_HERE'
Every week, Rankiteo analyzes billions of signals to give organizations a sharper, faster view of emerging risks. With deeper, more actionable intelligence at their fingertips, security teams can outpace threat actors, respond instantly to Zero-Day attacks, and dramatically shrink their risk exposure window.
Rankiteo is a unified scoring and risk platform that analyzes billions of signals weekly to help organizations gain faster, more actionable insights into emerging threats. Empowering teams to outpace adversaries and reduce exposure.