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Analyze » HungerRush » SBAHUNJET1772655860

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (SBAHUNJET1772655860)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-30
Company Score Before Incident754 / 1000
Company Score After Incident724 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERSBAHUNJET1772655860
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTORCompromised infrastructure (Twilio SendGrid), Infostealer malware
DATA EXPOSEDNames, emails, passwords, addresses, phone...
INCIDENT DATE30/09/2025
STATUSOngoing

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of HungerRush's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts HungerRush Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the HungerRush breach identified under incident ID SBAHUNJET1772655860.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of HungerRush's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/hungerrush, the number of followers: 17084, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 270 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 754 and after the incident was 724 with a difference of -30 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on HungerRush and their customers.

HungerRush recently reported "HungerRush POS Platform Targeted in Extortion Attack Affecting Thousands of Restaurants", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

Customers of restaurants using the HungerRush point-of-sale (POS) platform reported receiving extortion emails from a threat actor, warning that sensitive data could be exposed if the company fails to respond.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting HungerRush POS platform, online ordering, payment processing systems, and exposing Names, emails, passwords, addresses, phone numbers, birthdates, credit card details, with nearly Millions (claimed by threat actor) records at risk.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how Ongoing, and recommending next steps like Customers advised to remain vigilant for phishing attempts leveraging potentially exposed data, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Customers of affected restaurants advised to remain vigilant for phishing attempts.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating infostealer malware stole credentials for NetSuite, QuickBooks, Stripe, Salesforce, Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating hungerRush POS platform targeted, serves 16,000+ restaurants, and User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating infostealer malware infected employee device (October 2025). Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating infostealer malware infection on employee device. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory (T1003.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating infostealer malware stole credentials (NetSuite, QuickBooks, Stripe) and Credentials from Password Stores (T1555) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating credentials for Visa Online, Bill.com, Salesforce compromised. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating stolen credentials used to access HungerRush infrastructure (SendGrid). Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating millions of records claimed such as names, emails, passwords, credit card details. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating emails sent via Twilio SendGrid (o10.e.hungerrush.com). Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating threat actor claims access to millions of records for extortion. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with lower confidence (40%), supported by evidence indicating extortion emails threaten data exposure if demands not met and Defacement: Internal Defacement (T1491.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating emails sent from legitimate HungerRush infrastructure ([email protected]). Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing (T1553.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating emails passed SPF, DKIM, DMARC checks via compromised SendGrid. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (90%)
Exploit Public-Facing Application (60%)
User Execution: Malicious File (80%)
Execution
User Execution: Malicious File (80%)
Credential Access
OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory (70%)
Credentials from Password Stores (80%)
Lateral Movement
Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (80%)
Collection
Data from Local System (90%)
Command and Control
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (70%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (70%)
Impact
Data Encrypted for Impact (40%)
Defacement: Internal Defacement (60%)
Defense Evasion
Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing (80%)