Rankiteo Logo
Rankiteo
Leader in Cyber Underwriting
Loading...
NEWRankiteo Cyber Underwriting Desktop - Score, price, and bind from your desktop
WindowsmacOSLinux
Download
Analyze » HJUAVS 航見科技(HANG-JIAN TECH CO., LTD ) » HJU1768665139

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (HJU1768665139)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-18
Company Score Before Incident751 / 1000
Company Score After Incident733 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERHJU1768665139
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTORDLL side-loading via Microsoft Word 2010
DATA EXPOSEDCredentials, network access, remote command...
INCIDENT DATE15/06/2010
STATUSpublished

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of HJUAVS 航見科技(HANG-JIAN TECH CO., LTD )'s Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts HJUAVS 航見科技(HANG-JIAN TECH CO., LTD ) Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the HJUAVS 航見科技(HANG-JIAN TECH CO., LTD ) breach identified under incident ID HJU1768665139.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of HJUAVS 航見科技(HANG-JIAN TECH CO., LTD )'s information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/hjuav, the number of followers: 88, the industry type: Airlines and Aviation and the number of employees: 5 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 751 and after the incident was 733 with a difference of -18 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on HJUAVS 航見科技(HANG-JIAN TECH CO., LTD ) and their customers.

A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "Operation WordDrone: Hackers Exploit Microsoft Word 2010 Flaw to Target Taiwan’s Drone Industry", has drawn attention.

Cybersecurity firm Acronis has uncovered a sophisticated cyber campaign, *Operation WordDrone*, targeting Taiwan’s expanding drone manufacturing sector.

The disruption is felt across the environment, and exposing Credentials, network access, remote command execution.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how teams are taking away lessons such as Outdated software vulnerabilities can be repurposed in modern, high-stakes cyberattacks, posing risks to critical industries amid geopolitical tensions.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating exploited a long-standing vulnerability in Microsoft Word 2010 and Exploitation for Client Execution (T1203) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating dLL side-loading technique to deploy malware via Word installations. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating malware deployed through seemingly legitimate Word installations and System Services: Service Execution (T1569.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating dLL side-loading technique used for execution. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Event Triggered Execution: Accessibility Features (T1546.008) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating dLL side-loading via legitimate Word installations and Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading (T1574.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating dLL side-loading technique to deploy malware. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading (T1574.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating dLL side-loading technique used for privilege escalation. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating malware deployed through seemingly legitimate Word installations, Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading (T1574.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating dLL side-loading evaded traditional antivirus detection, and Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating attack evaded traditional antivirus detection. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified OS Credential Dumping (T1003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating malware enabled threat actors to steal credentials. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery (T1087) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating lateral movement across networks implies account discovery and File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating lateral movement across networks. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating move laterally across networks and Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating lateral movement across networks. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating command-and-control (C2) infrastructure traced to Taiwanese servers and Proxy: External Proxy (T1090.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating c2 infrastructure suggests proxy usage. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating cyber espionage targeting military-grade UAV sector. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating steal credentials, network access, remote command execution and Automated Collection (T1119) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating cyber espionage targeting drone manufacturing sector. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Exploit Public-Facing Application (80%)
Exploitation for Client Execution (90%)
Execution
User Execution: Malicious File (80%)
System Services: Service Execution (70%)
Persistence
Event Triggered Execution: Accessibility Features (60%)
Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading (90%)
Privilege Escalation
Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading (80%)
Defense Evasion
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (90%)
Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading (90%)
Obfuscated Files or Information (70%)
Credential Access
OS Credential Dumping (80%)
Discovery
Account Discovery (70%)
File and Directory Discovery (60%)
Lateral Movement
Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (70%)
Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (70%)
Command and Control
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (80%)
Proxy: External Proxy (60%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (80%)
Collection
Data from Local System (80%)
Automated Collection (70%)

Sources & References