Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (HETFAN1773908769)
The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.
Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of Hetzner Finland Oy's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts Hetzner Finland Oy Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Hetzner Finland Oy breach identified under incident ID HETFAN1773908769.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Hetzner Finland Oy's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/hetzner-finland-oy, the number of followers: 1275, the industry type: IT Services and IT Consulting and the number of employees: 32 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 750 and after the incident was 732 with a difference of -18 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Hetzner Finland Oy and their customers.
Dade Samane Fanava Company (PJS) recently reported "Iranian Server Misconfiguration Exposes Censorship-Bypass Relay and SSH Botnet Operation", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.
Researchers at Hunt.io uncovered a misconfigured open directory on an Iranian server, revealing a live censorship-bypass relay and SSH-based botnet infrastructure operated by a single actor.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Censorship-bypass relay and SSH botnet infrastructure.
Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.
The case underscores how Completed, teams are taking away lessons such as Low-sophistication threat actors can repurpose techniques associated with APT groups for financial or personal gain. Misconfigured servers can expose critical infrastructure and operations, and recommending next steps like Monitor for unusual gcc usage, anomalous screen sessions, and high-concurrency SSH activity from IOCs. Implement proper server configuration and access controls.
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating misconfigured open directory on an Iranian server and Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating sSH-based botnet infrastructure using concurrent SSH sessions. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell (T1059.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating bash history allowed reconstruction of operation phases, User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating mHDDOS installer and C-based flood tools found on server, and Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell (T1059.003) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating ohhhh.py and yse.py scripts automating SSH-based infections. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Server Software Component: Web Shell (T1505.003) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating 3x-ui used for censorship bypass (potential persistence) and Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service (T1543.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating cnc.c launched in detached screen sessions for persistence. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories (T1564.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating open directory exposed 449 files across 59 subdirectories and Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating paqet tunnel used for censorship bypass (appears as VPN relay). Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Brute Force: Password Guessing (T1110.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ohhhh.py opened 500 concurrent SSH sessions (likely brute force). Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: SSH (T1021.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating sSH-based botnet with scripts automating infections across hosts. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Proxy: External Proxy (T1090.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating 15-node relay network split between Hetzner and Iranian ISPs, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating kCP-based Paqet tunnel forwarding traffic to Hetzner node, and Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography (T1573.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating let’s Encrypt TLS certificate for ***.server21.org. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Network Denial of Service (T1498) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating mHDDOS and custom SYN/UDP flood tools targeting game/web servers. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- Hetzner Finland Oy Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/hetzner-finland-oy/incident/HETFAN1773908769
- Hetzner Finland Oy CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/hetzner-finland-oy
- Hetzner Finland Oy Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/hetfan1773908769-hetzner-dade-samane-fanava-company-cyber-attack-february-2026/
- Hetzner Finland Oy CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/hetzner-finland-oy/history
- Hetzner Finland Oy CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://gbhackers.com/iran-linked-botnet/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf