Comparison Overview
Hampton

Hampton
7930 Jones Branch Drive, Suite 1100, McLean, 22102, US
Last Update: 04/09/2026
The Hampton brand, including Hampton Inn, Hampton Inn & Suites and Hampton by Hilton, is an award-winning leader in the upper-midscale hotel segment. With more than 2,700 properties in 32 countries globally, Hampton is part of Hilton Worldwide, the leading global hospit...

IHG Hotels & Resorts
Windsor Dials 1, Arthur Road, Windsor, Berkshire, GB, SL4 1RS
Last Update: 11/09/2026
IHG Hotels & Resorts [LON:IHG, NYSE:IHG (ADRs)] is a global hospitality company, with a purpose to provide True Hospitality for Good. With a family of 19 hotel brands and IHG One Rewards, one of the world's largest hotel loyalty programmes, IHG has over 6,300 open hote...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Hampton







IHG Hotels & Resorts






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Hospitality Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Hampton in 2026.
Incidents vs Hospitality Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for IHG Hotels & Resorts in 2026.
Incident History - Hampton (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Hampton cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - IHG Hotels & Resorts (X = Date, Y = Severity)
IHG Hotels & Resorts cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Hampton

IHG Hotels & Resorts
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.