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Analyze » Group-IB » GRO1787156738

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (GRO1787156738)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-20
Company Score Before Incident734 / 1000
Company Score After Incident714 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERGRO1787156738
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTORAI-generated voice calls, Live phishing pages, Android malware, WebSocket-based real-time relay
DATA EXPOSEDCredentials, financial data, MFA codes,...
INCIDENT DATE30/09/2025
STATUSpublished

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Group-IB's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Group-IB Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Group-IB breach identified under incident ID GRO1787156738.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Group-IB's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/group-ib, the number of followers: 169472, the industry type: Computer and Network Security and the number of employees: 566 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 734 and after the incident was 714 with a difference of -20 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Group-IB and their customers.

On 01 October 2025, a cybersecurity incident called "AI-Powered Phishing Campaign Targets Mexican Banking Customers in Real-Time Fraud Scheme" came to light.

A sophisticated phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) operation, tracked as Balonx Sistema, is combining AI-generated voice calls, live phishing pages, and Android malware to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) and hijack customer accounts at over 20 Mexican financial institutions.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Customer banking accounts and Android devices, and exposing Credentials, financial data, MFA codes, SMS messages, banking app activity, personally identifiable information (PII), with nearly 1,100+ records at risk.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how teams are taking away lessons such as Limitations of SMS-based MFA highlighted; FIDO2 hardware keys recommended for stronger protection. Need for independent verification of unexpected calls and avoidance of unverified app installations, and recommending next steps like Monitor for unusual WebSocket activity and suspicious redirect chains, Implement FIDO2 hardware keys for MFA and Educate customers on verifying unexpected calls independently, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Victims urged to verify unexpected calls independently and avoid installing apps from unverified sources.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing (T1566) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating aI-generated voice calls, live phishing pages to hijack customer accounts, Phishing: Spearphishing Voice (T1566.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating aI-driven voice synthesis impersonating bank representatives (e.g., Carolina), and Drive-by Compromise (T1189) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating malicious Android app disguised as bank-protection alert delivered via fake pages. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating malicious Android app (package name `sacred.explosion`) installed by victims and Inter-Process Communication: Dynamic Data Exchange (T1559.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating spyroid RAT exfiltrates screen content, keystrokes, SMS messages via C2. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating spyroid-based RAT enables prolonged device control on Android. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching (T1548.003) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating rAT may exploit Android permissions to access SMS, banking apps. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Masquerading (T1036) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating malicious app disguised as bank-protection alert; phishing pages mimic banks, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating rAT may disable security features on compromised Android devices, and Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating stolen credentials and MFA codes used to access legitimate bank accounts. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Input Capture: Keylogging (T1056.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating spyroid RAT captures keystrokes and banking app activity, Adversary-in-the-Middle: DHCP Spoofing (T1557.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating real-time relay of MFA prompts via WebSocket to intercept codes, and Forge Web Credentials: SAML Tokens (T1606.002) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating fake verification screens capture SMS codes and ATM PINs. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified File and Directory Discovery (T1420) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating spyroid RAT exfiltrates screen content and banking app activity and Account Discovery: Local Account (T1087.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating rAT accesses SMS messages and installed apps on Android devices. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Screen Capture (T1113) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating spyroid RAT exfiltrates screen content from compromised devices, Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating credentials, financial data, SMS messages, banking app activity collected, and Video Capture (T1125) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating rAT may capture video from compromised Android devices. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating webSocket connection synchronizes phishing pages with attacker control panel and Non-Application Layer Protocol (T1095) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating rAT C2 server at `196.251.84.11 such as 7771/TCP`. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating spyroid RAT exfiltrates data via C2 server; 1,100+ victims compromised and Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating potential exfiltration of stolen data to attacker-controlled cloud storage. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with lower confidence (30%), supported by evidence indicating no evidence of ransomware, but financial fraud may disrupt services and Financial Theft (T1657) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating account hijacking, unauthorized transactions, large-scale banking fraud. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Phishing (95%)
Phishing: Spearphishing Voice (90%)
Drive-by Compromise (80%)
Execution
User Execution: Malicious File (90%)
Inter-Process Communication: Dynamic Data Exchange (70%)
Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (60%)
Privilege Escalation
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching (50%)
Defense Evasion
Masquerading (90%)
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (60%)
Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (80%)
Credential Access
Input Capture: Keylogging (90%)
Adversary-in-the-Middle: DHCP Spoofing (70%)
Forge Web Credentials: SAML Tokens (50%)
Discovery
File and Directory Discovery (70%)
Account Discovery: Local Account (60%)
Collection
Screen Capture (80%)
Data from Local System (90%)
Video Capture (60%)
Command and Control
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (90%)
Non-Application Layer Protocol (70%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (90%)
Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (50%)
Impact
Data Encrypted for Impact (30%)
Financial Theft (90%)

Sources & References