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Analyze » GRAV® » ORAGRA1789827870

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (ORAGRA1789827870)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-33
Company Score Before Incident767 / 1000
Company Score After Incident734 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERORAGRA1789827870
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTORUnauthenticated file upload vulnerability in Grav CMS
DATA EXPOSEDSource code, Grav CMS plugins,...
INCIDENT DATE30/09/2025
STATUSOngoing

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of GRAV®'s Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts GRAV® Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the GRAV® breach identified under incident ID ORAGRA1789827870.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of GRAV®'s information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/grav, the number of followers: 3039, the industry type: Retail and the number of employees: 33 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 767 and after the incident was 734 with a difference of -33 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on GRAV® and their customers.

Clop Ransomware Gang recently reported "ShinyHunters Breaches Clop Ransomware Gang’s Data Leak Site in Retaliatory Cyberattack", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

The ShinyHunters extortion group successfully breached and defaced Clop ransomware’s Tor-based data leak site, claiming to have stolen sensitive server data, including private keys for its onion service.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Clop ransomware gang’s Tor-based data leak site, and exposing Source code, Grav CMS plugins, system logs (including authentication records and visitor IPs), private keys for Tor onion service.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how Ongoing.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating exploited an unauthenticated file upload vulnerability in Grav CMS. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating uploaded a taunting message and a link to ShinyHunters’ own leak site. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating system logs (including authentication records and potential visitor IPs) and Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys (T1552.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating private keys for its onion service...stolen. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating stolen sensitive server data, including source code, Grav CMS plugins and Data from Information Repositories (T1213) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating system logs (including authentication records and visitor IPs). Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating claiming to have stolen sensitive server data. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Defacement: Internal Defacement (T1491.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating defaced Clop ransomware’s Tor-based data leak site and Compromise Infrastructure: Server (T1584.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating asserted full access to Clop’s server. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating private keys for Clop’s Tor onion service...could allow ShinyHunters to impersonate. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Exploit Public-Facing Application (90%)
Execution
User Execution: Malicious File (80%)
Credential Access
Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (80%)
Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys (90%)
Collection
Data from Local System (90%)
Data from Information Repositories (70%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (80%)
Impact
Defacement: Internal Defacement (90%)
Compromise Infrastructure: Server (80%)
Defense Evasion
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (70%)