Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (GOV1775759952)
The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.
Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of Government of Georgia's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts Government of Georgia Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Government of Georgia breach identified under incident ID GOV1775759952.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Government of Georgia's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/government-of-georgia, the number of followers: 0, the industry type: Government Relations Services and the number of employees: 48 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 813 and after the incident was 803 with a difference of -10 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Government of Georgia and their customers.
A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "New Russian-Linked Cyber-Espionage Group 'Curly COMrades' Targets Government and Energy Sectors", has drawn attention.
A newly identified cyber-espionage threat group, tracked as Curly COMrades, has been conducting operations aligned with Russian geopolitical interests since mid-2024.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Government/judicial bodies (Georgia), energy firms (Moldova), and exposing Credentials (NTDS database, LSASS memory), sensitive government and energy sector data.
Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.
The case underscores how Ongoing.
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating credential theft...dump the NTDS database from domain controllers and Supply Chain Compromise (T1195) with lower confidence (30%), supported by evidence indicating undetermined initial access vector. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating powerShell Active Directory enumeration to move laterally, Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task (T1053.005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating registered as scheduled tasks...for persistence, and System Services: Service Execution (T1569.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating windows services for persistence. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (T1543.003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating windows services for persistence, Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking (T1546.015) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating cOM hijacking to load a second .NET stage, and Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task (T1053.005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating disabled scheduled task that executes at random intervals. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating dump the NTDS database from domain controllers and Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking (T1546.015) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating cOM hijacking to target NGEN. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating aMSI bypass to evade Windows’ Antimalware Scan Interface, Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating custom Base64 alphabet...encrypted payload execution, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating index.png and icon.png files actually encrypted data blobs, and Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 (T1218.011) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating .NET-based malware leveraging COM objects. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager (T1003.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating dump the NTDS database from domain controllers and OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory (T1003.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating extract LSASS memory for active credentials. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery: Domain Account (T1087.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating powerShell Active Directory enumeration, System Network Configuration Discovery (T1016) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating lOLBin commands such as netstat, ipconfig, systeminfo, System Information Discovery (T1082) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating lOLBin commands such as systeminfo, wmic, and Process Discovery (T1057) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating lOLBin commands such as tasklist. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating legitimate remote monitoring tools (RuRat, RMM software) and Remote Services: Windows Remote Management (T1021.006) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating sSH with Stunnel for remote port forwarding. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating sensitive government and energy sector data compromised and Data from Information Repositories: Sharepoint (T1213.002) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating active Directory enumeration. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating communication with C2 over TCP ports 443 or 8443, Proxy: External Proxy (T1090.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating custom SOCKS5 servers...CurlCat obfuscates traffic, Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating go-based Resocks retrieved via curl.exe, and Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography (T1573.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating encrypted payload execution...custom Base64 alphabet. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltration via curl.exe and CurlCat and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating curlCat relays traffic through compromised legitimate websites. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Defacement: Internal Defacement (T1491.001) with lower confidence (40%), supported by evidence indicating potential disruption of critical services. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- Government of Georgia Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/government-of-georgia/incident/GOV1775759952
- Government of Georgia CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/government-of-georgia
- Government of Georgia Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/gov1775759952-government-and-judicial-bodies-in-georgia-cyber-attack-august-2025/
- Government of Georgia CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/government-of-georgia/history
- Government of Georgia CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/curly-comrades-cyberspies-hit-govt-orgs-with-custom-malware/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf