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Analyze » Google » GOO1781613134

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (GOO1781613134)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-18
Company Score Before Incident372 / 1000
Company Score After Incident354 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERGOO1781613134
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTOREmail (phishing links)
DATA EXPOSEDGmail credentials, 2FA codes, personally...
INCIDENT DATE28/02/2026
STATUSOngoing

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Google's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Google Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Google breach identified under incident ID GOO1781613134.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Google's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/google, the number of followers: 41943502, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 313465 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 372 and after the incident was 354 with a difference of -18 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Google and their customers.

On 01 March 2026, a cybersecurity incident called "Ghostwriter (UNC1151) Escalates Phishing Attacks with Advanced Gmail Credential Harvesting" came to light.

CERT Polska uncovered a significant evolution in the phishing operations of the threat group Ghostwriter (UNC1151), which has shifted from targeting Polish email providers to high-volume Gmail credential harvesting campaigns, including the theft of two-factor authentication (2...

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Email accounts (Gmail), personal and organizational accounts, and exposing Gmail credentials, 2FA codes, personally identifiable information (PII).

In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Domain monitoring, phishing-resistant authentication (e.g., hardware security keys), monitoring for credential stuffing and anomalous logins, and began remediation that includes Neutralizing lookalike domains, user education on phishing awareness.

The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as SMS and app-based 2FA are vulnerable to phishing; stronger security controls (e.g., hardware security keys) are necessary. Threat actors demonstrate adaptability and persistence in targeting high-value individuals, and recommending next steps like Adopt phishing-resistant authentication (e.g., hardware security keys), Monitor for credential stuffing and anomalous logins and Implement domain monitoring to identify and neutralize lookalike domains.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing (T1566) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including polished Polish-language phishing emails, and links in the emails direct victims to fake Gmail login panels, Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating links in the emails direct victims to fake Gmail login panels hosted on rapidly rotating domains, and Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.002) with lower confidence (30%), supported by evidence indicating no evidence of malicious attachments, but phishing emails are highly targeted. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Input Capture: Keylogging (T1056.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating fake Gmail login panels...prompt for a one-time code (SMS or app-generated), Brute Force: Password Guessing (T1110.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating attackers guess email addresses based on common names, Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (T1557.001) with lower confidence (20%), supported by evidence indicating no direct evidence, but fake login panels may intercept credentials, and Forge Web Credentials: SAML Tokens (T1606.002) with lower confidence (10%), supported by evidence indicating no evidence of SAML token forgery in this incident. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Input Capture: Keylogging (T1056.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating fake Gmail login panels harvest credentials and 2FA codes, Email Collection: Local Email Collection (T1114.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating gmail credentials compromised, enabling access to emails, and Data from Information Repositories: Sharepoint (T1213.002) with lower confidence (30%), supported by evidence indicating no direct evidence, but Gmail access may lead to other repositories. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories (T1564.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating fake Gmail login panels hosted on abused hosting services (e.g., *.netlify.app), Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including altered display names to appear legitimate, and fake Gmail login panels, Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms (T1568.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating rapidly rotating domains...new ones appearing almost daily, and Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating compromised Gmail accounts used to send phishing emails. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating gmail credentials and 2FA codes harvested and likely exfiltrated and Transfer Data to Cloud Account (T1537) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating no direct evidence, but credentials may be used to access cloud data. Under the Reconnaissance tactic, the analysis identified Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Service (T1598.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating targeting strategy focuses on political actors, journalists, researchers, Gather Victim Identity Information: Credentials (T1589.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating harvesting of Gmail credentials and 2FA codes, and Gather Victim Network Information: Domain Properties (T1590.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating abused hosting services and compromised legitimate websites. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Phishing (95%)
Phishing: Spearphishing Link (90%)
Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment (30%)
Credential Access
Input Capture: Keylogging (80%)
Brute Force: Password Guessing (50%)
Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (20%)
Forge Web Credentials: SAML Tokens (10%)
Collection
Input Capture: Keylogging (80%)
Email Collection: Local Email Collection (70%)
Data from Information Repositories: Sharepoint (30%)
Defense Evasion
Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories (60%)
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (90%)
Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms (70%)
Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (80%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (70%)
Transfer Data to Cloud Account (60%)
Reconnaissance
Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Service (80%)
Gather Victim Identity Information: Credentials (90%)
Gather Victim Network Information: Domain Properties (50%)

Sources & References