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Analyze » Government of Kenya » GOK1772087108

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (GOK1772087108)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-21
Company Score Before Incident737 / 1000
Company Score After Incident716 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERGOK1772087108
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTORExploiting internet-facing systems, Vulnerable web servers, Edge devices
DATA EXPOSEDPersonally identifiable information (PII), Names,...
INCIDENT DATE17/02/2026
STATUSDisrupted

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Government of Kenya's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Government of Kenya Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Government of Kenya breach identified under incident ID GOK1772087108.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Government of Kenya's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/gok-government-of-kenya, the number of followers: 825, the industry type: Government Administration and the number of employees: 205 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 737 and after the incident was 716 with a difference of -21 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Government of Kenya and their customers.

A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "Google Disrupts Major Chinese State-Linked Cyber Espionage Campaign Targeting Global Telecoms and Governments", has drawn attention.

Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG), in collaboration with Mandiant and industry partners, has dismantled a large-scale cyber espionage operation attributed to UNC2814, a suspected People’s Republic of China (PRC)-linked threat group active since at least 2017.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Telecommunications systems and Government systems, and exposing Personally identifiable information (PII), Names and Phone numbers.

In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Termination of attacker-controlled Google Cloud projects, Sinkholing domains and Revoking access to compromised accounts, and began remediation that includes Release of detection signatures and Direct notifications and support to affected organizations.

The case underscores how Disrupted.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating initial access often involved exploiting internet-facing systems, such as vulnerable web servers. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter (T1059) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating gRIDTIDE backdoor could execute shell commands. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (T1543.003) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating deployed GRIDTIDE backdoor for long-term access. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating attackers used SSH and service accounts for lateral movement, Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules (T1564.008) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating gRIDTIDE abused Google Sheets API calls to blend malicious traffic, Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating 16-byte cryptographic key stored on hosts to decrypt Google Drive configs, and Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography (T1573.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating softEther VPN Bridge used for encrypted outbound traffic. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Steal Application Access Token (T1528) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating gRIDTIDE used Google Drive configurations including service accounts and private keys. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery (T1087) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating targeted systems containing PII, call detail records, and lawful intercept systems. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating pII, names, phone numbers, birth details, national ID numbers compromised and Automated Collection (T1119) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating gRIDTIDE polled spreadsheet cells for commands and exfiltrated files. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Web Service (T1102) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating gRIDTIDE leveraged Google Sheets as a command-and-control channel and Application Layer Protocol: DNS (T1071.004) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating used legitimate cloud activity to evade detection. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating gRIDTIDE exfiltrated files and data via Google Sheets interactions and Transfer Data to Cloud Account (T1537) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltration via Google Drive and Sheets API. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Defacement: Internal Defacement (T1491.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating potential access to lawful intercept systems for surveillance. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Exploit Public-Facing Application (90%)
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter (80%)
Persistence
Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (60%)
Defense Evasion
Valid Accounts (80%)
Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules (70%)
Obfuscated Files or Information (80%)
Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography (70%)
Credential Access
Steal Application Access Token (80%)
Discovery
Account Discovery (70%)
Collection
Data from Local System (90%)
Automated Collection (80%)
Command and Control
Web Service (90%)
Application Layer Protocol: DNS (60%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (90%)
Transfer Data to Cloud Account (80%)
Impact
Defacement: Internal Defacement (50%)

Sources & References