Comparison Overview
Glasses Direct

Glasses Direct
40 Clifton Street, London, EC2A 4DX, GB
Last Update: 19/02/2026
Founded in 2004, Glasses Direct is the UK’s most trusted online glasses retailer, with over 185,000 reviews on Trustpilot and more than 2 million customers! With its customer-centric ethos, Glasses Direct is changing the way people buy prescription glasses in the UK. Gl...

Sam's Club
2101 SE Simple Savings Dr, Bentonville, Arkansas, US, 72712
Last Update: 30/04/2026
Sam’s Club (Nasdaq: WMT) a division of Walmart Inc., is the membership warehouse club solution for everyday living. Our President and CEO is Chris Nicholas and our headquarters is in Bentonville, AR. For the fiscal year ending January 31, 2023, Sam’s Club’s total revenu...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Glasses Direct







Sam's Club






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Glasses Direct in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
Sam's Club has 2.91% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Glasses Direct (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Glasses Direct cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Sam's Club (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Sam's Club cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Glasses Direct

Sam's Club
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
In OpenStack Ironic before 38.0.1, the autodetect deploy interface may fail to run cleaning immediately after enrollment with, or changing to, the autodetect deploy interface.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. A user with FEATURE_BUILD_SUPPORT enabled and repository write access can exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability within the build API. This allows the user to provide a malicious URL, causing the Quay builder to make requests to internal network addresses. Such an action could lead to the disclosure of sensitive internal information.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's exported logs feature. An unauthenticated attacker with a valid file ID could download exported action logs without proper authorization. While file IDs are complex, they can be intercepted from plaintext email or webhook callbacks. This vulnerability leads to information disclosure, potentially exposing sensitive data such as usernames, email addresses, IP addresses, and action-specific metadata.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's Stripe billing webhook handler. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to forge billing events by sending crafted JSON requests to the `/webhooks/stripe` endpoint without validating the Stripe-Signature header. Successful exploitation can lead to the unauthorized resetting of a namespace's build quota to its maximum and trigger unsolicited billing emails to namespace administrators.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. When the SECURITY_SCANNER_V4_PSK (pre-shared key) is not set, a remote unauthenticated attacker can send POST requests to the security scanner notification endpoint. This allows the attacker to flood the notification queue and inject path traversal characters into Clair API URL paths. The primary consequence is worker resource exhaustion and blind path manipulation on the configured Clair host, potentially leading to a denial of service.