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Analyze » Gitea » GITVIR1790403867

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (GITVIR1790403867)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-80
Company Score Before Incident751 / 1000
Company Score After Incident671 / 1000
Company LinkView Gitea Profile
INCIDENT NUMBERGITVIR1790403867
Type of Cyber IncidentBreach
ATTACK VECTORExploitation of CVE-2026-60004 (Gitea RCE vulnerability)
DATA EXPOSEDProprietary repositories, SCADA- and HMI-related...
INCIDENT DATE31/12/2025
STATUSpublished

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Gitea's Breach and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Gitea Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Gitea breach identified under incident ID GITVIR1790403867.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Gitea's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/gitea-org, the number of followers: 905, the industry type: Information Services and the number of employees: 3 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 751 and after the incident was 671 with a difference of -80 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Gitea and their customers.

A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "Red Heron Exploits Critical Gitea RCE Flaw to Deploy Linux Backdoor and Rootkit", has drawn attention.

A suspected Chinese-speaking threat actor, Red Heron, has been exploiting CVE-2026-60004, a critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in Gitea (versions 1.17–1.27.0), to target internet-exposed source-code servers.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Internet-exposed Gitea servers (versions 1.17–1.27.0), Linux systems, and exposing Proprietary repositories, SCADA- and HMI-related source code, over 18,000 government records, with nearly Over 18,000 government records records at risk.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

Overall, the incident is a reminder of why proactive monitoring and strong governance matter.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating exploiting CVE-2026-60004, a critical RCE vulnerability in Gitea (versions 1.17–1.27.0). Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Client Execution (T1203) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating leverages Gitea’s vulnerable diffpatch API to gain remote execution and Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell (T1059.004) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating jITTERLY Linux implant enables remote shell execution. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Kernel Modules and Extensions (T1547.006) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating sIXZUT rootkit relies on /etc/ld.so.preload for persistence and Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service (T1543.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating rootkit automatically relaunches agents if stopped. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Setuid and Setgid (T1548.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating sIXZUT rootkit intercepts Linux library functions for privilege escalation. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories (T1564.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating sIXZUT conceals malicious files, processes, and network connections, DLL Side-Loading (T1073) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating lD_PRELOAD rootkit intercepts Linux library functions to evade detection, and Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating malicious files named /usr/lib/__hesti/__hesti and /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libnss_cache.so.2. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating sCADA- and HMI-related source code stolen (may contain hardcoded credentials). Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating jITTERLY Linux implant enables file transfers and internal network pivoting and Network Service Discovery (T1046) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating jITTERLY supports SOCKS tunneling for internal network pivoting. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Cloud Storage (T1530) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating proprietary repositories and SCADA/HMI source code stolen from Gitea servers and Data from Local System (T1005) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating over 18,000 government records exfiltrated. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Proxy: External Proxy (T1090.002) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating jITTERLY agents use domains p1.981666.xyz such as 6443 and p2.981666.xyz such as 8080 and Protocol Tunneling (T1572) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating jITTERLY supports SOCKS tunneling for C2 communication. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating sensitive data exfiltrated via JITTERLY Linux backdoor and Automated Exfiltration (T1020) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating over 18,000 government records and proprietary source code stolen. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Resource Hijacking (T1496) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating persistent backdoor access via JITTERLY and SIXZUT rootkit. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Exploit Public-Facing Application (95%)
Execution
Exploitation for Client Execution (90%)
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell (85%)
Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Kernel Modules and Extensions (90%)
Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service (70%)
Privilege Escalation
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Setuid and Setgid (80%)
Defense Evasion
Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories (90%)
DLL Side-Loading (85%)
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (80%)
Credential Access
Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (70%)
Discovery
File and Directory Discovery (85%)
Network Service Discovery (80%)
Collection
Data from Cloud Storage (90%)
Data from Local System (85%)
Command and Control
Proxy: External Proxy (85%)
Protocol Tunneling (80%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (90%)
Automated Exfiltration (80%)
Impact
Resource Hijacking (70%)

Sources & References