Company Details
free-russia-foundation
22
2,455
8135
4freerussia.org
0
FRE_9358059
In-progress

Free Russia Foundation Company CyberSecurity Posture
4freerussia.orgThe Free Russia Foundation is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, nongovernmental U.S.-based organization, led by Russians abroad that seeks to be a voice for those who can’t speak under the repression of the current Russian leadership. We represent and coordinate the Russia diaspora. We pay special attention to those who have recently left Russia due to the considerable deterioration of the political and economic situation. We are focused on developing a strategic vision of Russia 'After Putin’ and ‘Without Putinism’ and concrete program for the transition period. We will continue to inform international policy-makers, mass media and opinion leaders on the real situation in Russia. We know firsthand the reality taking place in our country, and have suffered for this; therefore we understand this better than many other people. We maintain our extensive networks of key political, business and civil society leaders throughout Russia. This gives us access to news and events in real time. In addition, we are a hub for recently transplanted Russians and experts on every aspect of Russian society.
Company Details
free-russia-foundation
22
2,455
8135
4freerussia.org
0
FRE_9358059
In-progress
Between 650 and 699

FRF Global Score (TPRM)XXXX

Description: A sophisticated spear-phishing campaign targeted Russian and Belarusian military personnel, specifically those in the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) and Belarusian Special Forces (UAV/drone operators). The attack employed weaponized LNK files disguised as military-themed PDFs (e.g., *‘ТЛГ на убытие на переподготовку.pdf.lnk’* and *‘Исх №6626 Представление на назначение на воинскую должность.pdf.lnk’*). Upon execution, the malware established persistence via scheduled tasks, deployed a hidden SSH service (port 20321) with RSA-key authentication for threat actor access, and created a Tor hidden service to exfiltrate data, enable RDP/SMB lateral movement, and maintain full interactive control over compromised systems. The campaign’s infrastructure and tactics—including custom Tor pluggable transports and SSHD configurations—mirrored those of Russian APT groups (e.g., Sandworm/APT44, APT28), though attribution remains unconfirmed. Researchers noted parallels to pro-Ukraine APTs (Angry Likho, Awaken Likho) but could not definitively link the operation. The attack’s focus on military units specializing in drones and airborne operations suggests strategic espionage or sabotage objectives, potentially threatening operational security, command-chain integrity, and classified intelligence. The use of Tor and encrypted channels indicates a high likelihood of sustained, undetected access to sensitive defense networks.
Description: The EastWind campaign utilized sophisticated backdoors to target Russian entities, compromising government and IT organizations' security. Malware delivered via phishing emails installed PlugY and GrewApacha backdoors on victims' systems. The ill-intended actors leveraged public services like Dropbox and LiveJournal for command and control, executing wide-ranging functions including data theft and system monitoring. The implication of APT groups APT27 and APT31 indicates the sharing of advanced cyber-espionage tools, which signifies a higher threat level due to the coordinated and resourceful nature of the attackers. The campaign resulted in the unauthorized access and potential exfiltration of sensitive information, posing a critical concern for national security and the affected institutions' operational integrity.


Free Russia Foundation has 31.58% more incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Free Russia Foundation has 29.87% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Free Russia Foundation reported 1 incidents this year: 1 cyber attacks, 0 ransomware, 0 vulnerabilities, 0 data breaches, compared to industry peers with at least 1 incident.
FRF cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries

The Free Russia Foundation is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, nongovernmental U.S.-based organization, led by Russians abroad that seeks to be a voice for those who can’t speak under the repression of the current Russian leadership. We represent and coordinate the Russia diaspora. We pay special attention to those who have recently left Russia due to the considerable deterioration of the political and economic situation. We are focused on developing a strategic vision of Russia 'After Putin’ and ‘Without Putinism’ and concrete program for the transition period. We will continue to inform international policy-makers, mass media and opinion leaders on the real situation in Russia. We know firsthand the reality taking place in our country, and have suffered for this; therefore we understand this better than many other people. We maintain our extensive networks of key political, business and civil society leaders throughout Russia. This gives us access to news and events in real time. In addition, we are a hub for recently transplanted Russians and experts on every aspect of Russian society.


World Vision is the largest child-focused private charity in the world. Our 33,000+ staff members working in nearly 100 countries have united with our incredible supporters to impact the lives of over 200 million vulnerable children by tackling the root causes of poverty. Through World Vision every

We support peace and prosperity by building connections, understanding and trust between people in the UK and countries worldwide. We uniquely combine the UK’s deep expertise in arts and culture, education and the English language, our global presence and relationships in over 100 countries, our un

TED’s mission is to discover and champion the ideas that will shape tomorrow. Powerful ideas, powerfully presented, can move us to feel something, to think differently, to take action and create a brighter future. TED finds these powerful ideas across disciplines and around the globe, from people w
The Salvation Army is the nation's largest direct provider of social services. Annually, we help millions overcome poverty, addiction, and spiritual and economic hardships by preaching the gospel of Jesus Christ and meeting human needs in His name without discrimination in nearly every zip code.

AIESEC develops leadership among youth aged 18 to 30 and contributes to strengthening the global employability market by providing an end-to-end international talent recruitment solution for Enterprises, NGOs, and Start-ups. AIESEC is the world's largest youth-run organization developing the leader

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is an international, independent, medical humanitarian organisation working to provide medical assistance to people affected by conflict, epidemics, disasters, or exclusion from healthcare. Since our founding in 1971, we’ve grown to a global movement delivering human

Casa de la Familia (CDLF) is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization founded in 1996 by Clinical Psychologist Dr. Ana Nogales whose vision was to create an organization dedicated to ensuring long-lasting mental health success of children, youth, and families in response to psychological trauma. We prov

Every day, we help millions of people to make journeys across London: By Tube, bus, tram, car, bike – and more. People don’t associate us with journeys by river, on foot or via the air, but we help with that, too. Getting people to where they need to go has been our business for over 100 years, and
The International Rescue Committee responds to the world’s worst humanitarian crises and help people to survive, recover, and gain control of their future. Founded in 1933 at the request of Albert Einstein, the IRC offers lifesaving care and life-changing assistance to refugees and displaced peopl
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The journalism nonprofit Reporters Without Borders and another organization reported phishing attempts to cybersecurity researchers,...
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Researchers have revealed several malicious packages on the npm registry that have been found impersonating the Nomic Foundation's Hardhat tool.

Explore insights on cybersecurity incidents, risk posture, and Rankiteo's assessments.
The official website of Free Russia Foundation is http://www.4freerussia.org.
According to Rankiteo, Free Russia Foundation’s AI-generated cybersecurity score is 662, reflecting their Weak security posture.
According to Rankiteo, Free Russia Foundation currently holds 0 security badges, indicating that no recognized compliance certifications are currently verified for the organization.
According to Rankiteo, Free Russia Foundation is not certified under SOC 2 Type 1.
According to Rankiteo, Free Russia Foundation does not hold a SOC 2 Type 2 certification.
According to Rankiteo, Free Russia Foundation is not listed as GDPR compliant.
According to Rankiteo, Free Russia Foundation does not currently maintain PCI DSS compliance.
According to Rankiteo, Free Russia Foundation is not compliant with HIPAA regulations.
According to Rankiteo,Free Russia Foundation is not certified under ISO 27001, indicating the absence of a formally recognized information security management framework.
Free Russia Foundation operates primarily in the Non-profit Organizations industry.
Free Russia Foundation employs approximately 22 people worldwide.
Free Russia Foundation presently has no subsidiaries across any sectors.
Free Russia Foundation’s official LinkedIn profile has approximately 2,455 followers.
Free Russia Foundation is classified under the NAICS code 8135, which corresponds to Others.
No, Free Russia Foundation does not have a profile on Crunchbase.
Yes, Free Russia Foundation maintains an official LinkedIn profile, which is actively utilized for branding and talent engagement, which can be accessed here: https://www.linkedin.com/company/free-russia-foundation.
As of December 15, 2025, Rankiteo reports that Free Russia Foundation has experienced 2 cybersecurity incidents.
Free Russia Foundation has an estimated 21,009 peer or competitor companies worldwide.
Incident Types: The types of cybersecurity incidents that have occurred include Ransomware and Cyber Attack.
Detection and Response: The company detects and responds to cybersecurity incidents through an third party assistance with cyble research and intelligence labs (cril), third party assistance with seqrite labs..
Title: EastWind Campaign Targets Russian Entities
Description: The EastWind campaign utilized sophisticated backdoors to target Russian entities, compromising government and IT organizations' security. Malware delivered via phishing emails installed PlugY and GrewApacha backdoors on victims' systems. The ill-intended actors leveraged public services like Dropbox and LiveJournal for command and control, executing wide-ranging functions including data theft and system monitoring. The implication of APT groups APT27 and APT31 indicates the sharing of advanced cyber-espionage tools, which signifies a higher threat level due to the coordinated and resourceful nature of the attackers. The campaign resulted in the unauthorized access and potential exfiltration of sensitive information, posing a critical concern for national security and the affected institutions' operational integrity.
Type: Cyber-espionage
Attack Vector: Phishing emails
Threat Actor: APT27APT31
Motivation: Data theft, system monitoring
Title: Spear-phishing campaign targeting Russian and Belarusian military personnel with weaponized LNK files
Description: A spear-phishing campaign aimed to compromise Russian and Belarusian military personnel by using military-themed documents as a lure. The campaign used weaponized ZIP archives containing LNK files masquerading as PDFs (e.g., 'ТЛГ на убытие на переподготовку.pdf.lnk' and 'Исх №6626 Представление на назначение на воинскую должность.pdf.lnk'). Upon execution, the LNK file launches PowerShell to establish persistence, deploy OpenSSH for covert access, and create a Tor hidden service for exfiltration and lateral movement. The attack chain terminates if sandbox/automated analysis is detected.
Date Detected: October 2025
Date Publicly Disclosed: October 2025
Type: spear-phishing
Attack Vector: malicious LNK file (masquerading as PDF)weaponized ZIP archivePowerShell script executionTor hidden serviceOpenSSH backdoor
Vulnerability Exploited: human error (social engineering)LNK file executionPowerShell script abuse
Motivation: espionagemilitary intelligence gatheringpotential sabotage
Common Attack Types: The most common types of attacks the company has faced is Cyber Attack.
Identification of Attack Vectors: The company identifies the attack vectors used in incidents through Phishing emails and weaponized ZIP archivemalicious LNK file (PDF decoy).

Data Compromised: Sensitive information
Operational Impact: Potential operational integrity concerns

Data Compromised: Military documents, Potential operational intelligence, System credentials
Systems Affected: Windows systems of targeted military personnelRDP/SMB/SFTP services via Tor forwarding
Operational Impact: potential disruption of military communicationscompromise of UAV/drone operations intelligence
Brand Reputation Impact: potential reputational damage to Russian/Belarusian military cybersecurity posture
Identity Theft Risk: ['military personnel credentials']
Commonly Compromised Data Types: The types of data most commonly compromised in incidents are Sensitive information, Military Correspondence, Operational Documents, Potential Credentials and .

Entity Name: Russian Airborne Forces (VDV)
Entity Type: military
Industry: defense
Location: Russia

Entity Name: Belarusian Special Forces (UAV/drone operations)
Entity Type: military
Industry: defense
Location: Belarus

Third Party Assistance: Cyble Research And Intelligence Labs (Cril), Seqrite Labs.
Third-Party Assistance: The company involves third-party assistance in incident response through Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL), Seqrite Labs, .

Type of Data Compromised: Sensitive information
Sensitivity of Data: High
Data Exfiltration: Potential exfiltration

Type of Data Compromised: Military correspondence, Operational documents, Potential credentials
Sensitivity of Data: high (military intelligence)
Data Exfiltration: via Tor hidden serviceSFTP/RDP/SMB forwarding
File Types Exposed: PDF (decoy)LNKPowerShell scripts
Personally Identifiable Information: military personnel identitiespotential authentication tokens

Lessons Learned: Military personnel remain high-value targets for spear-phishing campaigns using socially engineered lures., LNK files masquerading as PDFs continue to be effective initial access vectors, especially in environments where document sharing is routine., Tor hidden services and OpenSSH backdoors enable stealthy persistence and exfiltration, bypassing traditional network defenses., Sandbox evasion techniques (e.g., premature script termination) highlight the need for behavioral analysis in malware detection., Cross-referencing TTPs with known APT groups (e.g., Sandworm, Angry Likho) is critical for attribution but may remain inconclusive.

Recommendations: Implement strict email filtering for LNK/shortcut files, especially in military contexts., Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to monitor PowerShell script execution chains., Restrict outbound Tor traffic and non-standard SSH ports (e.g., 20321) in military networks., Conduct regular red-team exercises simulating military-themed spear-phishing lures., Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access services (RDP, SSH, etc.)., Isolate high-value military systems from general-purpose networks to limit lateral movement., Provide targeted cybersecurity training for military personnel on recognizing socially engineered military documents.Implement strict email filtering for LNK/shortcut files, especially in military contexts., Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to monitor PowerShell script execution chains., Restrict outbound Tor traffic and non-standard SSH ports (e.g., 20321) in military networks., Conduct regular red-team exercises simulating military-themed spear-phishing lures., Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access services (RDP, SSH, etc.)., Isolate high-value military systems from general-purpose networks to limit lateral movement., Provide targeted cybersecurity training for military personnel on recognizing socially engineered military documents.Implement strict email filtering for LNK/shortcut files, especially in military contexts., Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to monitor PowerShell script execution chains., Restrict outbound Tor traffic and non-standard SSH ports (e.g., 20321) in military networks., Conduct regular red-team exercises simulating military-themed spear-phishing lures., Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access services (RDP, SSH, etc.)., Isolate high-value military systems from general-purpose networks to limit lateral movement., Provide targeted cybersecurity training for military personnel on recognizing socially engineered military documents.Implement strict email filtering for LNK/shortcut files, especially in military contexts., Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to monitor PowerShell script execution chains., Restrict outbound Tor traffic and non-standard SSH ports (e.g., 20321) in military networks., Conduct regular red-team exercises simulating military-themed spear-phishing lures., Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access services (RDP, SSH, etc.)., Isolate high-value military systems from general-purpose networks to limit lateral movement., Provide targeted cybersecurity training for military personnel on recognizing socially engineered military documents.Implement strict email filtering for LNK/shortcut files, especially in military contexts., Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to monitor PowerShell script execution chains., Restrict outbound Tor traffic and non-standard SSH ports (e.g., 20321) in military networks., Conduct regular red-team exercises simulating military-themed spear-phishing lures., Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access services (RDP, SSH, etc.)., Isolate high-value military systems from general-purpose networks to limit lateral movement., Provide targeted cybersecurity training for military personnel on recognizing socially engineered military documents.Implement strict email filtering for LNK/shortcut files, especially in military contexts., Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to monitor PowerShell script execution chains., Restrict outbound Tor traffic and non-standard SSH ports (e.g., 20321) in military networks., Conduct regular red-team exercises simulating military-themed spear-phishing lures., Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access services (RDP, SSH, etc.)., Isolate high-value military systems from general-purpose networks to limit lateral movement., Provide targeted cybersecurity training for military personnel on recognizing socially engineered military documents.Implement strict email filtering for LNK/shortcut files, especially in military contexts., Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to monitor PowerShell script execution chains., Restrict outbound Tor traffic and non-standard SSH ports (e.g., 20321) in military networks., Conduct regular red-team exercises simulating military-themed spear-phishing lures., Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access services (RDP, SSH, etc.)., Isolate high-value military systems from general-purpose networks to limit lateral movement., Provide targeted cybersecurity training for military personnel on recognizing socially engineered military documents.
Key Lessons Learned: The key lessons learned from past incidents are Military personnel remain high-value targets for spear-phishing campaigns using socially engineered lures.,LNK files masquerading as PDFs continue to be effective initial access vectors, especially in environments where document sharing is routine.,Tor hidden services and OpenSSH backdoors enable stealthy persistence and exfiltration, bypassing traditional network defenses.,Sandbox evasion techniques (e.g., premature script termination) highlight the need for behavioral analysis in malware detection.,Cross-referencing TTPs with known APT groups (e.g., Sandworm, Angry Likho) is critical for attribution but may remain inconclusive.

Source: Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL)
Date Accessed: October 2025
Additional Resources: Stakeholders can find additional resources on cybersecurity best practices at and Source: Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL)Date Accessed: October 2025, and Source: Seqrite LabsDate Accessed: October 2025.

Investigation Status: ongoing (unattributed)

Entry Point: Phishing emails
Backdoors Established: ['PlugY', 'GrewApacha']

Entry Point: Weaponized Zip Archive, Malicious Lnk File (Pdf Decoy),
Backdoors Established: ['OpenSSH service (port 20321, RSA key auth)', 'Tor hidden service with port forwarding (RDP/SFTP/SMB)', 'scheduled task persistence']
High Value Targets: Russian Airborne Forces (Vdv) Personnel, Belarusian Special Forces (Uav Operators),
Data Sold on Dark Web: Russian Airborne Forces (Vdv) Personnel, Belarusian Special Forces (Uav Operators),

Root Causes: Successful Social Engineering Exploiting Military Document Themes., Lack Of Restrictions On Lnk File Execution In High-Security Environments., Inadequate Monitoring Of Powershell Script Execution And Outbound Tor Traffic., Over-Reliance On Perimeter Defenses Without Behavioral Analysis For Evasive Malware.,
Post-Incident Analysis Process: The company's process for conducting post-incident analysis is described as Cyble Research And Intelligence Labs (Cril), Seqrite Labs, .
Last Attacking Group: The attacking group in the last incident was an APT27APT31.
Most Recent Incident Detected: The most recent incident detected was on October 2025.
Most Recent Incident Publicly Disclosed: The most recent incident publicly disclosed was on October 2025.
Most Significant Data Compromised: The most significant data compromised in an incident were Sensitive information, military documents, potential operational intelligence, system credentials and .
Most Significant System Affected: The most significant system affected in an incident was Windows systems of targeted military personnelRDP/SMB/SFTP services via Tor forwarding.
Third-Party Assistance in Most Recent Incident: The third-party assistance involved in the most recent incident was cyble research and intelligence labs (cril), seqrite labs, .
Most Sensitive Data Compromised: The most sensitive data compromised in a breach were military documents, potential operational intelligence, Sensitive information and system credentials.
Most Significant Lesson Learned: The most significant lesson learned from past incidents was Cross-referencing TTPs with known APT groups (e.g., Sandworm, Angry Likho) is critical for attribution but may remain inconclusive.
Most Significant Recommendation Implemented: The most significant recommendation implemented to improve cybersecurity was Implement strict email filtering for LNK/shortcut files, especially in military contexts., Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to monitor PowerShell script execution chains., Isolate high-value military systems from general-purpose networks to limit lateral movement., Restrict outbound Tor traffic and non-standard SSH ports (e.g., 20321) in military networks., Conduct regular red-team exercises simulating military-themed spear-phishing lures., Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all remote access services (RDP, SSH, etc.). and Provide targeted cybersecurity training for military personnel on recognizing socially engineered military documents..
Most Recent Source: The most recent source of information about an incident are Seqrite Labs and Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL).
Current Status of Most Recent Investigation: The current status of the most recent investigation is ongoing (unattributed).
Most Recent Entry Point: The most recent entry point used by an initial access broker was an Phishing emails.
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