Comparison Overview
Fora Financial

Fora Financial
New York, 10018, US
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Fora Financial was founded in 2008, with the mission to provide capital funding to small business under a simple and seamless process. We are passionately driven to solve business owners’ biggest challenge to success: access to capital. With Fora Financials’ help, smal...

Principal Financial Group
711 High St., Des Moines, Iowa, US, 50309
Last Update: 14/09/2026
Principal Financial Group® is dedicated to improving the wealth and well-being of people and businesses around the world—helping more than 62M customers plan, protect, invest, and retire as of December 31, 2023. Along the way, we commit to supporting the communities whe...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Fora Financial







Principal Financial Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Fora Financial in 2026.
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Principal Financial Group in 2026.
Incident History - Fora Financial (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Fora Financial cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Principal Financial Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Principal Financial Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Fora Financial

Principal Financial Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.