Comparison Overview
Foot Locker

Foot Locker
330 West 34th Street, New York City, New York, US, 10001
Last Update: 11/09/2026
Foot Locker, Inc. is a leading footwear and apparel retailer that unlocks the “inner sneakerhead” in all of us. With approximately 2,500 retail stores in 26 countries across North America, Europe, Asia, Australia, and New Zealand, and a franchised store presence in the ...

Metro Inc.
11011 boul. Maurice-Duplessis, Montréal, H1C 1V6, CA
Last Update: 07/09/2026
With annual sales of more than $21 billion, METRO Inc. is a food and pharmacy leader in Québec and Ontario, providing employment to more than 97,000 people. Its purpose is to Nourish the health and well-being of our communities. As a retailer, franchisor, distributor, m...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Foot Locker







Metro Inc.






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Foot Locker in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Metro Inc. in 2026.
Incident History - Foot Locker (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Foot Locker cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Metro Inc. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Metro Inc. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Foot Locker

Metro Inc.
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.