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Analyze » Flexera » FLESCH1782484233

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (FLESCH1782484233)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-2
Company Score Before Incident765 / 1000
Company Score After Incident763 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERFLESCH1782484233
Type of Cyber IncidentVulnerability
ATTACK VECTORLocal
DATA EXPOSEDSensitive data, stored credentials, configuration...
INCIDENT DATE31/12/2023
STATUSpublished

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Flexera's Vulnerability and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Flexera Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Flexera breach identified under incident ID FLESCH1782484233.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Flexera's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/flexera, the number of followers: 153949, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 2091 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 765 and after the incident was 763 with a difference of -2 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Flexera and their customers.

Schneider Electric recently reported "Critical Privilege Escalation Vulnerability in Schneider Electric Floating License Manager (CVE-2024-2658)", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

A high-severity vulnerability (CVE-2024-2658) has been identified in Schneider Electric’s Floating License Manager (FLM), specifically within the FlexNet Publisher component, a third-party licensing library integrated into industrial automation software.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Industrial automation software, PLCs, SCADA systems, engineering workstations, and exposing Sensitive data, stored credentials, configuration files.

In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Upgrade to Schneider Electric FLM 3.0.0.0 or later, Restrict directory permissions on C:\cygwin to deny write access for Authenticated Users and Isolate FLM on dedicated servers with strict access controls, and began remediation that includes Upgrade to Schneider Electric FLM 3.0.0.0 or later.

The case underscores how teams are taking away lessons such as Risks in third-party dependencies and hardcoded path vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure software, and recommending next steps like Upgrade to Schneider Electric FLM 3.0.0.0 or later, Restrict directory permissions on C:\cygwin to deny write access for Authenticated Users and Isolate FLM on dedicated servers with strict access controls.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating cVE-2024-2658 allows local non-administrative user to escalate to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM and Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading (T1574.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating lmadmin.exe loads malicious DLL via hardcoded OpenSSL config file path. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (T1543.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating lmadmin.exe runs as NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE, persists via service restart. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading (T1574.002) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating exploits hardcoded path to load attacker-controlled DLL via openssl.cnf and Exploitation for Defense Evasion (T1211) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating uses CVE-2024-2658 to bypass default Windows NTFS permissions. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Lateral Tool Transfer (T1570) with moderate to high confidence (75%), supported by evidence indicating full system compromise enables lateral movement across industrial networks. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Manipulation of Control (T0880) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating exploitation could disrupt license services and automation software availability and Loss of Control (T0829) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating enables manipulation of automation processes in ICS environments. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating local access required; no remote exploitation possible without prior foothold. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Privilege Escalation
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (95%)
Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading (90%)
Persistence
Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (80%)
Defense Evasion
Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading (85%)
Exploitation for Defense Evasion (70%)
Lateral Movement
Lateral Tool Transfer (75%)
Impact
Manipulation of Control (80%)
Loss of Control (70%)
Initial Access
Valid Accounts (60%)

Sources & References