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Analyze » Exodus » EXOWOR1788326823

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (EXOWOR1788326823)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-51
Company Score Before Incident715 / 1000
Company Score After Incident664 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBEREXOWOR1788326823
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTORJavaScript-based lures (PDF document with .pdf.js extension), Software update in ZIP archive
DATA EXPOSEDBrowser data (passwords, cookies, autofill,...
INCIDENT DATE17/08/2026
STATUSOngoing

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Exodus's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Exodus Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Exodus breach identified under incident ID EXOWOR1788326823.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Exodus's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/exodus-io, the number of followers: 16291, the industry type: Financial Services and the number of employees: 285 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 715 and after the incident was 664 with a difference of -51 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Exodus and their customers.

A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "Sophisticated Malware Campaign Abuses Trojanized Exodus Wallet Installer to Deploy Modular RAT", has drawn attention.

A stealthy malware campaign has exploited a trojanized installer for the legitimate Exodus cryptocurrency wallet to distribute a modular remote access trojan (RAT) designed for long-term interactive access rather than immediate cryptocurrency theft.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Windows systems with Exodus Wallet installer, and exposing Browser data (passwords, cookies, autofill, extensions), potential session hijacking.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how Ongoing, and recommending next steps like Treat detections as full interactive compromises. Monitor for IOCs such as the installer (jn0101.msi), modified Exodus Wallet files, scheduled tasks (ExdBackupTool, INetHealth), and artifacts like %TEMP%\<guid>.tmp.node and debug.log.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating javaScript-based lures disguised as PDF document (.pdf.js extension), Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating software update contained in a ZIP archive, and Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain (T1195.002) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating trojanized Exodus Wallet installer (v24.33.4) with zero VirusTotal detections. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating opening the .pdf.js file triggers Windows Script Host to install malicious MSI, Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript (T1059.007) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating javaScript-based lures execute malicious payloads via Windows Script Host, and Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec (T1218.007) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating silently installs malicious MSI package via msiexec. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task (T1053.005) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating scheduled task (ExdBackupTool) relaunches invisible Exodus.exe hourly. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating mSI masquerades as Background Service from Apple Inc., Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads (T1027.009) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating 50 MB JavaScript component decrypts 10 MB Windows RAT in memory, Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window (T1564.003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating electron windows patched to run invisibly without taskbar entry, Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating malware wipes cookies to force reauthentication, and Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading (T1574.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating trojanized Exodus Wallet (3 of 1,973 files modified). Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (T1555.003) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating rAT targets Chrome, Edge, Firefox for passwords, cookies, autofill, extensions and Steal Web Session Cookie (T1539) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating malware wipes cookies to force reauthentication and capture new sessions. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating rAT includes file operations module for discovery and Query Registry (T1012) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating rAT retrieves user’s Internet Explorer proxy configuration. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating modular RAT with remote command execution and file operations, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating uses Azure Table Storage as dead drop for C2, blending with Microsoft cloud, and Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography (T1573.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating likely encrypted C2 communications via Azure Table Storage. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating browser data theft (passwords, cookies, autofill) via modular RAT and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating azure Table Storage used for C2, likely exfiltrating stolen data. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: VNC (T1021.005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating rAT includes hidden VNC access module and Proxy: Internal Proxy (T1090.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating rAT includes SOCKS proxying module for lateral movement. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment (90%)
Phishing: Spearphishing Link (80%)
Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain (95%)
Execution
User Execution: Malicious File (90%)
Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript (90%)
Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec (90%)
Persistence
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task (95%)
Defense Evasion
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (95%)
Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads (90%)
Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window (90%)
Indicator Removal: File Deletion (70%)
Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading (80%)
Credential Access
Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (95%)
Steal Web Session Cookie (90%)
Discovery
File and Directory Discovery (80%)
Query Registry (70%)
Command and Control
Ingress Tool Transfer (80%)
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (90%)
Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography (70%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (90%)
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol (80%)
Lateral Movement
Remote Services: VNC (90%)
Proxy: Internal Proxy (90%)

Sources & References