Musée du Louvre (Louvre Museum) Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (ETA4592045110925)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Musée du Louvre (Louvre Museum) breach identified under incident ID ETA4592045110925.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Musée du Louvre (Louvre Museum)'s information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/etablissement-public-du-musee-du-louvre, the number of followers: 1277, the industry type: Museums, Historical Sites, and Zoos and the number of employees: 27 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 752 and after the incident was 738 with a difference of -14 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Musée du Louvre (Louvre Museum) and their customers.

Louvre Museum recently reported "Louvre Museum Jewel Heist Exposing Weak Password Security", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

Thieves stole $100 million in jewels from the Louvre Museum in Paris, France, exploiting weak digital security measures, including the use of 'Louvre' and 'Thales' as passwords for the surveillance system.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Surveillance System and Physical Security (Rooftop Access), plus an estimated financial loss of $100 million (Stolen Jewels).

In response, and began remediation that includes Potential Password Policy Updates and Physical Security Reinforcements (Post-Incident), and stakeholders are being briefed through Media Statements (No Direct Response to CyberGuy by Deadline) and Public Advisories on Security Improvements.

The case underscores how Ongoing (Media Reports; Louvre Did Not Respond to Requests for Comment), teams are taking away lessons such as Even high-profile institutions can fall victim to basic cybersecurity oversights (e.g., weak passwords, outdated systems), Physical and digital security are intertwined; vulnerabilities in one can exacerbate risks in the other and Password hygiene (e.g., avoiding default/guessable passwords, using password managers) is critical for all organizations, and recommending next steps like Implement strong password policies (e.g., complexity requirements, regular rotation, multi-factor authentication), Conduct regular cybersecurity audits to identify and remediate vulnerabilities (e.g., outdated software, unguarded access points) and Use password managers to generate and store unique, complex credentials securely, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering General Public Warnings on Password Security (via CyberGuy.com).

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Default Accounts (T1078.001) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including use of Louvre and Thales as passwords for the surveillance system, and weak Password Policy (Password such as Louvre, Thales) and External Remote Services (T1133) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating outdated Windows Server 2003 software likely exposed remote access vulnerabilities. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Default Accounts (T1078.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating weak passwords like Louvre and Thales... visibly displayed on the login screen. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Default Accounts (T1078.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating surveillance system used weak passwords... enabling unauthorized access and Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating outdated Windows Server 2003 software likely lacked modern security controls. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating weak passwords... visibly displayed on the login screen and Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Registry (T1552.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating windows Server 2003 may have stored credentials insecurely by default. Under the Physical Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing: Spearphishing Link (Physical Lure) (T1566.002) with moderate to high confidence (75%), supported by evidence indicating unguarded rooftop access... exploited using an electric ladder (physical intrusion enabled by cyber lapses). Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Endpoint Denial of Service: Application or System Exploitation (T1499.004) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating compromised surveillance system enabled physical theft ($100M jewels) and Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with lower confidence (0%). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.