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Analyze » ESET » ESE1782332741

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (ESE1782332741)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-327
Company Score Before Incident707 / 1000
Company Score After Incident380 / 1000
Company LinkView ESET Profile
INCIDENT NUMBERESE1782332741
Type of Cyber IncidentRansomware
ATTACK VECTORmalware-as-a-service (MaaS), compromised WordPress sites, cross-site scripting (XSS)
DATA EXPOSED27 million stolen login credentials
INCIDENT DATE14/06/2026
STATUSongoing

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of ESET's Ransomware and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts ESET Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the ESET breach identified under incident ID ESE1782332741.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of ESET's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/eset, the number of followers: 93801, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 2007 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 707 and after the incident was 380 with a difference of -327 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on ESET and their customers.

On 19 June 2026, Amadey Malware disclosed malware, ransomware and credential theft issues under the banner "Global Law Enforcement Takedown Disrupts Amadey and StealC Malware Operations".

A coordinated international law enforcement operation, supported by private cybersecurity firms including Bitdefender, Bitsight, ESET, and Microsoft, has dismantled the infrastructure behind the Amadey and StealC malware families.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting 140,000 computers worldwide, 15,000 infected WordPress sites, and exposing 27 million stolen login credentials, with nearly 27 million records at risk, plus an estimated financial loss of $47 million in cryptocurrency assets restricted.

In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like seizure of 326 servers and 142 domains, restriction of $47 million in cryptocurrency assets and shutdown of 200 malicious C2 domains and IPs, and began remediation that includes recovery of 27 million stolen login credentials and disruption of 15,000 infected WordPress sites, while recovery efforts such as seizure of 18,000 victim devices continue.

The case underscores how ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as The operation highlights the growing collaboration between public and private sectors to dismantle cybercrime ecosystems, particularly those enabling ransomware and credential theft at scale.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating compromised WordPress sites used to spread SocGholish malware, Drive-by Compromise (T1189) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating 15,000 infected WordPress sites used to spread malware, and Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating malware distribution via compromised sites (implied phishing). Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating amadey executes commands, downloads payloads, and deploys secondary malware and Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell (T1059.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating amadey operates as a malware loader executing commands. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (T1543.003) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating amadey malware-as-a-service (MaaS) implies persistence mechanisms and Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating common persistence method for malware loaders like Amadey. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating amadey avoids execution in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus by checking locales, Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating malware-as-a-service (MaaS) implies obfuscation to evade detection, and Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating stealC terminates if running in specific countries. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory (T1003.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating 27 million stolen login credentials recovered, Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (T1555.003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating stealC targets browser data (credentials, cookies, autofill entries), and Steal Application Access Token (T1528) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating stealC targets desktop apps like Discord, Telegram, Steam. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating stealC collects files matching specific naming patterns and Email Collection: Local Email Collection (T1114.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating stealC targets Outlook data. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating amadey and StealC use C2 servers (326 seized, 200 domains shut down) and Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography (T1573.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating malware C2 communications likely encrypted. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating 27 million stolen credentials recovered; data exfiltration confirmed and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating stealC exfiltrates data via browser/app credentials. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating amadey deploys ransomware as secondary payload and Defacement: Internal Defacement (T1491.001) with lower confidence (40%), supported by evidence indicating 15,000 infected WordPress sites disrupted. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Exploit Public-Facing Application (80%)
Drive-by Compromise (70%)
Phishing: Spearphishing Link (60%)
Execution
User Execution: Malicious File (90%)
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell (70%)
Persistence
Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (60%)
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (50%)
Defense Evasion
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (70%)
Obfuscated Files or Information (80%)
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (60%)
Credential Access
OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory (90%)
Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (90%)
Steal Application Access Token (70%)
Collection
Data from Local System (90%)
Email Collection: Local Email Collection (70%)
Command and Control
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (90%)
Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography (60%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (90%)
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (70%)
Impact
Data Encrypted for Impact (50%)
Defacement: Internal Defacement (40%)

Sources & References