Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (UNISIGEMVTEA1782484008)
The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.
Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of Emvees Water | Waste Water Treatment LLC's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts Emvees Water | Waste Water Treatment LLC Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Emvees Water | Waste Water Treatment LLC breach identified under incident ID UNISIGEMVTEA1782484008.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Emvees Water | Waste Water Treatment LLC's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/emvees-waste-water-treatment-llc, the number of followers: 13937, the industry type: Environmental Services and the number of employees: 55 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 750 and after the incident was 733 with a difference of -17 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Emvees Water | Waste Water Treatment LLC and their customers.
Muleshoe Water System recently reported "State-Backed Hackers Target Water Utilities in U.S. and Europe, Exploiting Basic Security Flaws", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.
Since 2024, water and wastewater infrastructure across the U.S.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Water and wastewater treatment systems, PLCs (Unitronics Vision Series) and Dams.
In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Removing PLCs from public internet access and Enforcing multi-factor authentication, and began remediation that includes Improving OT monitoring and Hardening security measures.
The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as Attackers exploited preventable security gaps such as default credentials, poor network segmentation, and unsecured remote access tools. The incidents highlight the need for basic hardening measures in critical infrastructure, and recommending next steps like Remove PLCs from public internet access, Enforce multi-factor authentication and Improve IT/OT network segmentation, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Federal agencies (CISA, FBI, NSA, EPA) have issued repeated warnings to water utilities about the need for basic security hardening measures.
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified External Remote Services (T1133) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including exploited default credentials on Unitronics Vision Series PLCs, and exposed industrial control ports (e.g., TCP/44818, TCP/2222), Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including default or weak passwords and shared operator accounts, and dropbear SSH for remote access, and Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including internet-exposed PLCs and HMIs, and targeted network ports (TCP/502, TCP/22). Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter (T1059) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating living-off-the-land tools like wmic, ntdsutil.exe, and PowerShell and Exploitation for Client Execution (T1203) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating exploited weak security in critical systems via exposed PLCs. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating shared operator accounts and weak passwords enabled long-term access and External Remote Services (T1133) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating dropbear SSH used for remote access persistence. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating default credentials and shared accounts provided elevated access. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating used legitimate credentials to blend in with normal activity, Masquerading (T1036) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating living-off-the-land tools (wmic, ntdsutil.exe, PowerShell) evaded detection, and Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating poor IT/OT segmentation allowed evasion of monitoring tools. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Brute Force (T1110) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating exploited default or weak passwords in water utility systems and Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating shared operator accounts and default credentials used for access. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Network Service Discovery (T1046) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating targeted exposed industrial control ports (TCP/44818, TCP/2222, TCP/502) and File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating used living-off-the-land tools (wmic, PowerShell) for system discovery. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation of Remote Services (T1210) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating exploited poor IT/OT segmentation to move laterally and Remote Services: SSH (T1021.004) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating used Dropbear SSH for lateral movement in networks. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Automated Collection (T1119) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating volt Typhoon embedded in networks for long-term access and data collection. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol (T1071) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating used SSH (TCP/22) and industrial control ports (TCP/502) for C2 and Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating dropbear SSH and living-off-the-land tools transferred for C2. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Manipulation of Control (T0883) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating water tank overflow, floodgate manipulation, altered chemical dosing parameters and Loss of Control (T0829) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating 30–45-minute water tank overflow in Muleshoe, Texas. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- Emvees Water | Waste Water Treatment LLC Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/emvees-waste-water-treatment-llc/incident/UNISIGEMVTEA1782484008
- Emvees Water | Waste Water Treatment LLC CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/emvees-waste-water-treatment-llc
- Emvees Water | Waste Water Treatment LLC Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/unisigemvtea1782484008-bremanger-dam-muleshoe-water-system-unitronics-polish-water-treatment-plants-cyber-attack-january-2024/
- Emvees Water | Waste Water Treatment LLC CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/emvees-waste-water-treatment-llc/history
- Emvees Water | Waste Water Treatment LLC CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://cybersecuritynews.com/hackers-exploit-weak-credentials-and-internet-facing-plcs/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf