Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (NETEGN1780907044)
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Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of Egnyte's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts Egnyte Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Egnyte breach identified under incident ID NETEGN1780907044.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Egnyte's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/egnyte, the number of followers: 220549, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 1292 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 764 and after the incident was 747 with a difference of -17 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Egnyte and their customers.
A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "VerdantBamboo Exploits pfSense Firewall in Long-Running Cyberattack", has drawn attention.
VerdantBamboo (also tracked as WARP PANDA and UNC5221) compromised a pfSense firewall and deployed a FreeBSD variant of the BRICKSTORM backdoor, granting persistent access to a managed service provider’s (MSP) network.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting pfSense firewall, Linux-based Egnyte Storage Sync virtual appliance and Synology NAS device, and exposing True.
In response, teams activated the incident response plan.
The case underscores how Completed (Volexity investigation), teams are taking away lessons such as Advanced threat actors target edge devices (firewalls, storage appliances, VPNs, NAS devices) with limited EDR coverage. Persistent access can be maintained for extended periods using valid credentials and malware like BRICKSTORM, and recommending next steps like Enhance monitoring of edge devices, implement robust EDR solutions, enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA), and conduct regular credential audits to prevent unauthorized access.
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including compromised a pfSense firewall, and targeting edge devices with limited security monitoring and Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including leveraged valid credentials, and stolen administrative credentials. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (T1543.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating modifying /etc/rc.d/cron to execute the implant automatically and Server Software Component: Web Shell (T1505.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating bRICKSTORM implant deployed in /usr/local/libexec/ipsec/. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including stolen administrative credentials, and enabled web SSL VPN access on the firewall. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating blending into normal traffic and bypassing Conditional Access rules, Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window (T1564.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating bRICKSTORM supports remote command execution via a web interface, and Proxy: External Proxy (T1090.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating malware proxy features to access Microsoft 365 environment. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including stolen administrative credentials, and valid credentials leveraged. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery (T1087) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating access to the victim’s Microsoft 365 environment and File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating bRICKSTORM supports file system access. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating enabled web SSL VPN access on the firewall and Proxy: External Proxy (T1090.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating sOCKS5 proxying for lateral movement. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating bRICKSTORM supports file system access. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Proxy: External Proxy (T1090.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating sOCKS5 proxying, traffic obfuscation via Cloudflare IP addresses and Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating deployed additional malware on Synology NAS device. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including data exfiltration, and persistent unauthorized access for 18 months. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Resource Hijacking (T1496) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating persistent access to MSP’s network for 18 months. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- Egnyte Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/egnyte/incident/NETEGN1780907044
- Egnyte CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/egnyte
- Egnyte Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/netegn1780907044-egnyte-pfsense-cyber-attack-december-2024/
- Egnyte CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/egnyte/history
- Egnyte CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://cyberpress.org/verdantbamboo-breaches-pfsense-firewall/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf