Comparison Overview
DHS Center for Countering Human Trafficking

DHS Center for Countering Human Trafficking
500 12th St SW, Washington, DC, 20536, US
Last Update: 12/05/2026
The Department of Homeland Security’s Center for Countering Human Trafficking (CCHT) is a DHS-wide effort comprised of 16 supporting offices and components and is the first unified, inter-component coordination center for countering human trafficking and the importation...

Metropolitan Police
Victoria Embankment, Westminster, SW1A 2JL, GB
Last Update: 15/08/2026
The Metropolitan Police Service is famed around the world and has a unique place in the history of policing. Our headquarters at New Scotland Yard - and its iconic revolving sign - has provided the backdrop to some of the most high profile and complex law enforcement ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

DHS Center for Countering Human Trafficking







Metropolitan Police






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Law Enforcement Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for DHS Center for Countering Human Trafficking in 2026.
Incidents vs Law Enforcement Industry Avg (This Year)
Metropolitan Police has 94.17% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - DHS Center for Countering Human Trafficking (X = Date, Y = Severity)
DHS Center for Countering Human Trafficking cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Metropolitan Police (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Metropolitan Police cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

DHS Center for Countering Human Trafficking

Metropolitan Police
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.