DES A.I CyberSecurity Scoring
03/04/2026
Access Monitoring Plan
Access Monitoring Plan
No incidents recorded for DES in 2026.
No incidents recorded for DES in 2026.
No incidents recorded for DES in 2026.
Architecture and Planning
China State Construction Engineering Corporation Ltd (in short: China Construction; Stock code: 601668), formally established on December 10, 2007, was co-initiated by four Fortune Global 500 enterprises: China State Construction Engineering Corp. (CSCEC), China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Baosteel Group Corporation Ltd and Sinochem Corporation. China Construction was successfully listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange on July 29, 2009. China Construction has inherited all superior assets and corporate culture of CSCEC, with its business covering housing construction, international contracting, real estate development and investment, infrastructure construction and investment, prospecting and design. China Construction is China’s largest construction and real estate conglomerate and biggest building work contractor. It is the largest transnational construction company in the developing countries and the top home builder in the world, taking the long lead of China’s international contracting business. China Construction is well known in the world for undertaking super high-rise, grand scale, cutting-edge and novel projects and has built up a great number of landmark projects in China and around the world. Such business concept and brand image of China Construction as “Providing Excellent Services across all Continents with Superior Quality as the Top Priority” is universally acknowledged and commended. China Construction is one of the most integrated construction and real estate conglomerates in China with the longest history of specialized operation and market-oriented management. It is the only construction enterprise in China certified for 3 top grade Qualifications of general contracting for building works, municipal public works and highway works, in addition to “1+4” qualifications and first-grade qualification for engineering design of building industry.
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Authentication bypass using an alternate path or channel vulnerability in N-able N-central allows Authentication Bypass. This issue affects N-central: through 2026.1.
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature in ueberauth guardian allows an unauthenticated attacker to revoke a victim's session with a forged token. Guardian.revoke/3 in lib/guardian.ex decodes the supplied token with peek/1, which performs no signature verification (it only base64-decodes the JWT header and payload). The resulting unverified claims are forwarded directly to the configured token module's revoke callback and the implementation's on_revoke callback, a state-mutating sink. The sibling operations refresh/2 and exchange/4 both call decode_and_verify first, so the signature is checked before anything acts on the claims; revoke/3 is the only state-mutating path that acts on claims without verifying the signature. An attacker who knows or guesses a victim's identifying claim values (jti, sub) can forge a JWT carrying those claims, sign it with an arbitrary key, and submit it to any endpoint that funnels a caller-supplied token into Guardian.revoke/3 (the standard logout / session-revocation pattern). When the token module mutates state keyed by the claims (whitelist deletion or blacklist insertion, for example a GuardianDb-style store), the victim's legitimate session is evicted. This is an unauthenticated session-revocation denial of service; the attacker never needs the signing secret. This issue affects guardian: from 1.0.0 before 2.4.1.
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ueberauth guardian (Guardian.Permissions module) allows a denial of service via BEAM atom-table exhaustion. This vulnerability is associated with program file lib/guardian/permissions.ex and program routines 'Elixir.Guardian.Permissions':encode_permissions!/1, 'Elixir.Guardian.Permissions':encode_permissions_into_claims!/2, 'Elixir.Guardian.Permissions':do_encode_permissions!/2. The Guardian.Permissions mixin installs a public encode_permissions!/1 function on every module that does use Guardian.Permissions. For each key of the supplied map, encode_permissions!/1 calls String.to_atom(to_string(k)) before any validation runs. The integer-value clause of do_encode_permissions!/2 then short-circuits straight to encoding without validating the key against the configured permission set, so a key with an integer value is interned as a fresh atom with no exception raised. Atoms are never garbage collected and the BEAM atom table is a fixed-size resource (default roughly 1,048,576 entries), so each unique attacker-chosen key permanently consumes one slot. An attacker who can influence a permission map that reaches encode_permissions!/1 (for example a permissions map read from a request body and passed into token issuance via encode_permissions_into_claims!/2) can mint an unbounded number of atoms and exhaust the atom table, crashing the entire BEAM node and every service running on it. The sibling decode_permissions/1 is not affected because it skips keys absent from the configured permission set. This issue affects guardian: from 2.0.0 before 2.4.1.
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ueberauth guardian allows denial of service via unbounded atom creation from attacker-controlled binary input. Guardian.Permissions.AtomEncoding encodes permission scopes by passing arbitrary binaries to String.to_atom/1. When encode/3 in lib/guardian/permissions/atom_encoding.ex is called with a list, each binary entry is handled by the encode_value/3 binary clause, which calls String.to_atom(value) with no allow-list check. The perm_set argument (the application's small, finite set of legitimate permission names) is discarded, so any external string flows straight into atom creation. This encoder is selected with use Guardian.Permissions, encoding: Guardian.Permissions.AtomEncoding and reached through the imported encode/3 entry point. String.to_atom/1 creates a brand-new atom for every previously unseen binary, atoms are never garbage collected, and the BEAM atom table is fixed at roughly 1,048,576 entries by default. An application that funnels attacker-influenced permission scopes (from a request body, a JWT claim, or other external input) into encode/3 therefore mints one permanent atom per distinct value. A modest stream of varied, unauthenticated input permanently consumes the atom table and crashes the BEAM node with system_limit, taking down every application running on it. The default encoder is Guardian.Permissions.BitwiseEncoding, which is not affected. This issue affects guardian: from 2.0.0 before 2.4.1.
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ueberauth guardian allows denial of service via unbounded atom creation from attacker-influenced binary input. Guardian.Plug.Keys derives connection and session namespace keys by passing arbitrary binaries to String.to_atom/1. base_key/1 in lib/guardian/plug/keys.ex converts any binary into the atom :"guardian_<input>", and the derived helpers claims_key/1, resource_key/1, and token_key/1 create a second atom on top of that. key_from_other/1 likewise converts a regex-captured binary through String.to_atom/1. The public specs advertise String.t() as a valid argument, so passing a string is documented usage, and higher-level entry points such as Guardian.Plug.current_token(conn, key: key) thread the caller-supplied key straight into these functions. String.to_atom/1 creates a brand-new atom for every previously unseen binary, atoms are never garbage collected, and the BEAM atom table is fixed at roughly 1,048,576 entries by default. An application that routes attacker-influenced data (a tenant identifier, header, or other request input) into a Guardian key therefore mints one permanent atom per distinct value. A modest stream of varied, unauthenticated input permanently consumes the atom table and crashes the BEAM node, taking down every application running on it. This issue affects guardian: from 0.1.0 before 2.4.1.
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