Rankiteo Logo
Rankiteo
Leader in Cyber Underwriting
Loading...
NEWRankiteo Cyber Underwriting Desktop - Score, price, and bind from your desktop
WindowsmacOSLinux
Download
Analyze » CyberMaterial » ROGCYBTES1770724900

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (ROGCYBTES1770724900)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-156
Company Score Before Incident748 / 1000
Company Score After Incident592 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERROGCYBTES1770724900
Type of Cyber IncidentRansomware
ATTACK VECTORNA
DATA EXPOSED104 TB
INCIDENT DATE31/12/2025
STATUSpublished

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of CyberMaterial's Ransomware and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts CyberMaterial Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the CyberMaterial breach identified under incident ID ROGCYBTES1770724900.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of CyberMaterial's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/cybermaterial, the number of followers: 22270, the industry type: Computer and Network Security and the number of employees: 4 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 748 and after the incident was 592 with a difference of -156 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on CyberMaterial and their customers.

Iron Mountain recently reported "Ransomware Surge in January 2026: Shifting Targets and Emerging Threats", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

January 2026 marked a sharp rise in ransomware activity, with 711 attacks recorded.

The disruption is felt across the environment, and exposing 104 TB, with nearly 13,300 (Mt. Spokane Pediatrics and Pecan Tree Dental) records at risk.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how teams are taking away lessons such as Evolving ransomware tactics, shifting focus to high-value sectors, and delayed disclosures obscuring attack timelines.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating finance and tech sectors became prime targets, seeing 24% and 12% increases, External Remote Services (T1133) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware gangs shifting focus to high-value sectors, and Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001) with lower confidence (40%), supported by evidence indicating no specific vector mentioned, but phishing is common in ransomware. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware type incident with data encryption and exfiltration and Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating common in ransomware execution (implied by attack scale). Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware gangs often use compromised credentials for access and Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating common persistence mechanism in ransomware attacks. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware often requires elevated privileges for encryption and Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating use of compromised accounts for privilege escalation. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware encrypts data to evade detection and hinder recovery, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware often disables security tools to avoid detection, and Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware may delete logs or evidence post-attack. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified OS Credential Dumping (T1003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating banking data and PII exposed, suggesting credential theft and Credentials from Password Stores (T1555) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating common in ransomware attacks for lateral movement. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating 104 TB of data stolen, implying extensive discovery phase and Account Discovery: Domain Account (T1087.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware gangs often enumerate accounts for lateral movement. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating common in ransomware for lateral movement across networks and Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating frequently used in ransomware attacks for propagation. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating 104 TB of data stolen, including patient records and banking data and Data from Network Shared Drive (T1039) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware gangs often target shared drives for data exfiltration. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating common C2 channel for ransomware operations and Proxy: External Proxy (T1090.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware often uses proxies to obscure C2 traffic. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating 104 TB of data stolen, including 1.4 TB from Iron Mountain and Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware gangs may use cloud storage for data exfiltration. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with high confidence (100%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware type incident with confirmed data encryption, Service Stop (T1489) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating operation cancellations and patient transfers via Red Cross, and Inhibit System Recovery (T1490) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware often deletes backups to prevent recovery. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Exploit Public-Facing Application (60%)
External Remote Services (50%)
Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment (40%)
Execution
User Execution: Malicious File (70%)
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (50%)
Persistence
Valid Accounts (60%)
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (50%)
Privilege Escalation
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (60%)
Valid Accounts (70%)
Defense Evasion
Obfuscated Files or Information (80%)
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (70%)
Indicator Removal: File Deletion (60%)
Credential Access
OS Credential Dumping (70%)
Credentials from Password Stores (60%)
Discovery
File and Directory Discovery (80%)
Account Discovery: Domain Account (70%)
Lateral Movement
Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (70%)
Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (60%)
Collection
Data from Local System (90%)
Data from Network Shared Drive (80%)
Command and Control
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (70%)
Proxy: External Proxy (60%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (90%)
Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (60%)
Impact
Data Encrypted for Impact (100%)
Service Stop (70%)
Inhibit System Recovery (80%)

Sources & References