Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (SENCRO1778848441)
The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.
Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of CrowdStrike's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts CrowdStrike Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the CrowdStrike breach identified under incident ID SENCRO1778848441.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of CrowdStrike's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/crowdstrike, the number of followers: 977461, the industry type: Computer and Network Security and the number of employees: 10946 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 829 and after the incident was 823 with a difference of -6 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on CrowdStrike and their customers.
A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "OrBit Linux Rootkit Evolution and Widespread Adoption", has drawn attention.
A stealthy Linux rootkit known as OrBit has been actively abused by threat actors for over four years, evolving from a custom-built tool into a widely adopted malware framework.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Linux systems, including critical infrastructure and virtualized environments, and exposing SSH and sudo credentials, authentication flows.
Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.
The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as Linux environments are increasingly targeted by shared malware toolkits, and open-source tools can be repurposed for malicious use. Defenders must monitor for subtle behavioral indicators and hidden artifacts, and recommending next steps like Monitor for hidden filesystem artifacts (e.g., /lib/libseconf/), Detect PAM hooking activity and credential harvesting and Use known IOCs (hashes, file paths) for detection.
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating access compromised systems via a hidden SSH backdoor and Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools (T1195.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating repackaged version of Medusa, an open-source LD_PRELOAD rootkit. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Kernel Modules and Extensions (T1547.006) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating hijacking the system’s dynamic linker (ld.so) to inject a malicious shared library and Scheduled Task/Job: Cron (T1053.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating spreads via cron jobs and downloads payloads from remote domains. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Setuid and Setgid (T1548.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating intercepting authentication flows by hooking into PAM and Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Kernel Modules and Extensions (T1547.006) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating lD_PRELOAD hijacking to inject malicious shared library into every process. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified OS Credential Dumping: /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow (T1003.008) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating capturing SSH and sudo credentials via PAM hooking and Modify Authentication Process: Pluggable Authentication Modules (T1556.003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating intercepting authentication flows by hooking into PAM. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories (T1564.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating stores stolen credentials in hidden directories (e.g., /lib/libseconf/), Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service (T1036.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating manipulating over 40 libc functions to mask files, processes, and network connections, and Impair Defenses: Indicator Blocking (T1562.006) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating hides its presence by manipulating libc functions and audit log evasion. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating capturing SSH and sudo credentials via PAM hooking and Screen Capture (T1113) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating packet capture functionality in Lineage A variant. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating downloads payloads from remote domains via multi-stage infection chain and Protocol Tunneling (T1572) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating hidden SSH backdoor for attacker access. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating stolen credentials stored in hidden directories for later exfiltration. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- CrowdStrike Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/crowdstrike/incident/SENCRO1778848441
- CrowdStrike CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/crowdstrike
- CrowdStrike Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/sencro1778848441-unc3886-blockade-spider-cyber-attack-january-2022/
- CrowdStrike CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/crowdstrike/history
- CrowdStrike CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://gbhackers.com/orbit-rootkit-targets-linux/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf