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Analyze » CrowdSec » CROTAN1789971988

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (CROTAN1789971988)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-75
Company Score Before Incident749 / 1000
Company Score After Incident674 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERCROTAN1789971988
Type of Cyber IncidentBreach
ATTACK VECTORStolen GitHub OAuth Token
DATA EXPOSEDSource code, limited user contact...
INCIDENT DATE10/05/2026
STATUSCompleted (forensic review)

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of CrowdSec's Breach and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts CrowdSec Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the CrowdSec breach identified under incident ID CROTAN1789971988.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of CrowdSec's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/crowdsec, the number of followers: 14350, the industry type: Computer and Network Security and the number of employees: 30 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 749 and after the incident was 674 with a difference of -75 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on CrowdSec and their customers.

On 16 September 2024, CrowdSec disclosed Supply Chain Attack issues under the banner "CrowdSec Repositories Compromised via Stolen GitHub OAuth Token in Supply Chain Attack".

In a supply chain attack linked to the TanStack npm compromise, threat actors TeamPCP (UNC6780) exploited a stolen GitHub OAuth token to clone 170 private CrowdSec repositories, exposing source code, limited user contact details, and a restricted AWS credential.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting 170 private repositories, SaaS console code, automation tools, Consensus Algorithm, and exposing Source code, limited user contact details, restricted AWS credential, with nearly 170 repositories, 83 user email addresses records at risk.

In response, teams activated the incident response plan, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Account removal, credential rotation, token revocation, and began remediation that includes Forensic reviews, notifications to affected individuals, and stakeholders are being briefed through Public disclosure on September 16.

The case underscores how Completed (forensic review), teams are taking away lessons such as Risks in developer credential exposure, need for stricter offboarding controls and faster incident response, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Notifications sent to affected individuals.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain (T1195.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating supply chain attack linked to the TanStack npm compromise and Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating exploited a stolen GitHub OAuth token from former employee’s GitHub account. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Steal Application Access Token (T1528) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating stolen GitHub OAuth token used to clone 170 private repositories. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: Cloud Services (T1021.007) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating used the stolen OAuth token to download repositories from GitHub. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Code Repositories (T1213.003) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating cloned 170 private CrowdSec repositories, exposing source code and Data from Local System (T1005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating exposed email addresses of 83 users and investor details. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Transfer Data to Cloud Account (T1537) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating cloned repositories downloaded from an IP address in Toronto, Canada. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token (T1550.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating exploited a stolen GitHub OAuth token for unauthorized access. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Defacement: Internal Defacement (T1491.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating exposed source code could help adversaries identify vulnerabilities. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain (90%)
Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (95%)
Credential Access
Steal Application Access Token (95%)
Lateral Movement
Remote Services: Cloud Services (80%)
Collection
Data from Code Repositories (95%)
Data from Local System (80%)
Exfiltration
Transfer Data to Cloud Account (90%)
Defense Evasion
Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token (90%)
Impact
Defacement: Internal Defacement (70%)

Sources & References