Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (BANOBSCON1782901541)
The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.
Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of ConnectWise's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts ConnectWise Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the ConnectWise breach identified under incident ID BANOBSCON1782901541.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of ConnectWise's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/connectwise, the number of followers: 223791, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 3409 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 632 and after the incident was 613 with a difference of -19 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on ConnectWise and their customers.
On 01 October 2025, a cybersecurity incident called "Cybercriminals Exploit Legitimate Remote Access Tool in Large-Scale Malware Campaign" came to light.
Kaspersky’s Managed Detection and Response (MDR) team uncovered a sophisticated cyberattack leveraging ScreenConnect, a legitimate remote monitoring tool, to deploy AsyncRAT malware.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Windows systems with ScreenConnect and AsyncRAT installed, and exposing Potential credential theft and unauthorized access.
Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.
The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as Highlights risks of trusted remote tools and typosquatting, underscoring the need for strict software controls and outbound traffic monitoring, and recommending next steps like Implement strict software controls, Monitor outbound traffic and Disable or restrict use of remote access tools unless necessary.
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating typosquatted websites impersonating popular software like OBS Studio and Drive-by Compromise (T1189) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating fraudulent websites ranking high in search engine results due to SEO manipulation. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating victims unknowingly download malicious installers from fraudulent websites, Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating screenConnect deploys PowerShell and VBS scripts to disable defenses, and Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic (T1059.005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating vBScript (installer_method3_stream.vbs)drops files in C such as \Users\Public. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating modifies registry keys to turn off User Account Control (UAC) and Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task (T1053.005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating scheduled task (MasterPackager.Updater) re-executes every two minutes. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control (T1548.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating turn off User Account Control (UAC) by modifying registry keys and Process Injection: Process Hollowing (T1055.012) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating malware uses process hollowing to inject AsyncRAT into RegAsm.exe. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating disable Microsoft Defender by excluding critical directories, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating screenConnect installed under guise of Microsoft Update Service, Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading (T1574.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating malicious install.res.1033.dll sideloads ScreenConnect, Process Injection: Process Hollowing (T1055.012) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating asyncRAT injected into RegAsm.exe, a trusted Windows process, and Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Evasion (T1497.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating scheduled task re-executes every two minutes to maintain persistence. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Adversary-in-the-Middle (T1557) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating screenConnect and AsyncRAT likely used for credential theft and OS Credential Dumping (T1003) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating goal includes credential theft and unauthorized system access. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery: Local Account (T1087.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating asyncRAT deployed for unauthorized system access and File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating malware drops files in C such as \Users\Public for persistence. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Remote Access Software (T1219) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating screenConnect used as legitimate remote access tool for C2, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating asyncRAT connects to C2 domains like mora1987.work.gd, and Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating malicious DLL and AsyncRAT payload downloaded via ScreenConnect. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating asyncRAT connects to C2 for potential data exfiltration and Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating compromised endpoints potentially resold on dark web marketplaces. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Resource Hijacking (T1496) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating long-term control over infected devices via ScreenConnect and AsyncRAT. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- ConnectWise Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/connectwise/incident/BANOBSCON1782901541
- ConnectWise CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/connectwise
- ConnectWise Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/banobscon1782901541-bandicam-screenconnect-obs-studio-cyber-attack-march-2026/
- ConnectWise CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/connectwise/history
- ConnectWise CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://securelist.com/tr/the-soc-files-screenconnect-campaign-with-asyncrat/120472/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf